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I.

INTRODUCTION

According to the United States Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention, the number of resident deaths in the United States in 2014 was
approximately 2.6 million.4 Indeed, today, the United States population is
dying at a rate of 0.65 to 1 (deaths to births).5 Considering the high rates of
death to live births in the United States, it is not surprising that lawsuits
related to death issues abound in one form or another. However, because of
the wide variety of suits related to death matters, it is often difficult to follow
1. The authors wish to thank Christine L. Halling for her research assistance and Tracy Poissot
for some typing assistance.
2. Mary Catherine Joiner is a J.D. candidate at Southern University Law Center, where she is an
associate editor of the Southern University Law Review. Mary Catherine graduated from Loyola University
New Orleans in 2015 with a Bachelor of Business Administration in International Business. She is also
employed by Seale Funeral Home in Denham Springs, LA.
3. Ryan M. Seidemann holds a B.A. (Florida State Univ.) and M.A. (Louisiana State Univ.) in
anthropology as well as a B.C.L. and a J.D. in law (Louisiana State Univ.). He is currently enrolled as a
doctoral student in the Department of Planning and Urban Studies at the University of New Orleans. He
is the Section Chief of the Lands & Natural Resources Section, Civil Division, Louisiana Department of
Justice, as well as being an adjunct professor of law at Southern University Law Center in Baton Rouge,
Louisiana, and a death investigator for the West Baton Rouge Parish Coroner’s Office. He is also a
Registered Professional Archaeologist. The views and opinions expressed herein are solely those of the
author and do not necessarily represent the position of the Louisiana Department of Justice or the Attorney
General.
4. Kenneth D. Kochanek et al., Deaths: Final Data for 2014, 65(4) NAT’L VITAL STAT. REPS. 1,
1 (2016), https://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/nvsr/nvsr65/nvsr65_04.pdf.
5. Id. (depicting the where the calculated data derived from); Brady E. Hamilton et al., Births:
Final Data for 2014, 64(12) NAT’L VITAL STAT. REPS. 1, 2 (2015), https://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/nvsr/
nvsr64/nvsr64_12.pdf.

1
Published by DigitalCommons@ONU, 2018

1

Ohio Northern University Law Review, Vol. 45 [2018], Iss. 1, Art. 11

2

OHIO NORTHERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 45

any precedential threads.6 Among the types of various issues that arise with
regard to death that may, and sometimes do, lead to litigation in the United
States include desecration,7 mishandling or losing human remains,8 control
of remains,9 property disputes,10 regulatory issues,11 and the mismanagement
of cemetery trust funds.12 Indeed, death care matters such as those discussed
here are currently on the Supreme Court of the United States’ docket for the
October 2018 term.13 Not only is the law of the dead complex in its breadth,
6. See, e.g., Ryan M. Seidemann, How Do We Deal with All the Bodies? A Review of Recent
Cemetery and Human Remains Legal Issues, 3 U. BALT. J. LAND & DEV. 1, (2013).
7. See, e.g., 6 Things to Know About the Cemetery Vandalism in West Bridgewater, WICKED LOC.
(Mar. 16, 2016, 8:01 PM), bridgewaterwest.wickedlocal.com/article/20160315/NEWS/160316892
(discussing cemetery vandalism in Massachusetts); Attorney for Neighbors of Desecrated AfricanAmerican Cemetery: No Proof There is a Cemetery There, GREENWICH FREE PRESS (Sept. 23, 2016),
greenwichfreepress.com/news/government/attorney-for-neighbors-of-desecrated-africanamericancemetery-no-proof-there-is-a-cemetery-there-73657/ (describing a dispute over the historic location of a
cemetery in Greenwich, Connecticut, and its relationship to a later development).
8. See, e.g., Faimon A. Roberts, III, Human Skulls, Bones and Animal Bones, Blood Found by
Slidell Police on Home’s Makeshift Altar, NEW ORLEANS ADVOC. (Apr. 4, 2016, 1:49 PM),
www.theadvocate.com/new_orleans/news/communities/st_tammany/article_a4cda606-bc1a-52fb-921db0f7cd79f2df.html (recounting the discovery of a seeming ritualistic altar in South Louisiana that
contained human remains); Michelle R. Smith, Grave Error: Rhode Island Cemetery Puts Men in Wrong
Plots, WAOW NEWSLINE 9 (Aug. 16, 2016, 1:45 PM), www.waow.com/story/32771894/grave-errorrhode-island-cemetery-puts-men-in-wrong-plots (reporting incorrect placement of human remains within
a cemetery in Rhode Island).
9. See, e.g., Carrie Salls, Father Extends Fight to Control Late Son’s Remains Up to Louisiana
Supreme Court, LA. REC. (June 14, 2016, 4:14 PM), louisianarecord.com/stories/510856523-fatherextends-fight-to-control-late-son-s-remains-up-to-louisiana-supreme-court (recounting a Louisiana
citizen’s efforts to maintain exclusive control over his son’s human remains); Meagan Flynn, John
O’Quinn’s Former Lover Sues Funeral Home After It Transports His Body to Louisiana, HOUS. PRESS
(Mar. 29, 2016, 9:00 PM), www.houstonpress.com/news/john-oquinns-former-lover-sues-funeral-homeafter-it-transports-his-body-to-louisiana-8280826 (noting problematic situation regarding the control of
human remains).
10. See, e.g., Jim Thompson, Routing Greenway Through Cemetery is Sensitive Issue, AthensClarke Commissioners Told, ONLINE ATHENS: ATHENS BANNER-HERALD (Aug. 10, 2016, 2:00 PM),
onlineathens.com/mobile/2016-08-10/routing-greenway-through-cemetery-sensitive-issue-athens-clarkecommissioners-told (noting the sensitive nature of even seemingly harmless changes or impacts to a
Georgia cemetery); Shirley Ruhe, Church and Preservationists Clash over Graveyard: Preserving
Cemetery Would Affect Expansion Plans, ARLINGTON CONNECTION (Nov. 2, 2016),
www.connectionnewspapers.com/news/2016/nov/02/church-and-preservationists-clash-over-graveyard/
(discussing troubles of development and cemeteries interacting in Virginia).
11. See, e.g., David J. Mitchell, State Cemetery Board Members Recuse Themselves in Dispute
Over License, ADVOC. (May 24, 2016, 8:34 AM),
http://www.theadvocate.com/csp/mediapool/sites/Advocate/assets/templates/FullStoryPrint.csp?
(discussing the Louisiana Cemetery Board’s decision to wholesale recuse itself when allegations of bias
were raised related to a pending licensure hearing); Lucy Berry, Alabama Cemetery Owner Files Federal
Lawsuit Challenging State’s Casket Sales Law, ALA. MEDIA GROUP (Apr. 4, 2016, 3:50 PM),
www.al.com/business/index.ssf/2016/04/alabama_cemetery_owner_files_f.html (discussing regulation of
cemetery merchandise in Alabama).
12. See, e.g., Jenna Siffringer, Both Owners of Lamesa Memorial Park Now Behind Bars, KCBD
NEWS CHANNEL 11 (Sept. 15, 2016, 9:56 PM), www.kcbd.com/story/33107527/both-owners-of-lamesamemorial-park-now-behind-bars (discussing allegations of and arrests regarding misappropriation of
cemetery merchandise funds).
13. Knick v. Twp. of Scott, 862 F.3d 310, 314 (3d Cir. 2017).
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as this article demonstrates, but it is also spawning high-profile litigation.
This article is a review of the recent United States and Canadian jurisprudence
related to death matters with commentary and analysis aimed at assisting
practitioners faced with such cases in situating their issues within the larger
North American precedential structure of such cases.
II.

THE JURISPRUDENCE
A. Torts and the Dead

According to the facts in the matter of Coon v. Medical Center, Inc.14, on
February 8, 2011, at thirty-seven weeks pregnant, Amanda Coon “went for a
routine prenatal examination at her obstetrician-gynecologist’s office in
Columbus, Georgia.”15 At some point during the examination, Coon was
informed “that her unborn baby did not have a heartbeat.”16 The next day,
Coon delivered a stillborn baby.17 Sometime after “delivery, the hospital’s
bereavement coordinator spoke with Coon and her father, who [told] the
coordinator that the [baby’s remains] were to be released” to an Opelika,
Alabama, funeral home.18 The baby stayed in the room with Coon for a
period of time until Coon’s mother told the coordinator that the baby could
be removed.19 Thereafter, “the coordinator [put the] baby in a . . . holding
room . . . until someone could take the baby to the hospital morgue.”20 In the
holding room, there was also a stillborn “baby boy, who was less than 20
weeks in gestation” and much smaller.21 When Coon’s baby was put in the
holding room, the hospital was in the middle of a shift change and a new
nurse whose shift had just begun volunteered to bring the two babies down to
the morgue.22 Before transporting the babies, “identification tags [had to be]
placed on the arm and leg of [the] baby and on the outside of the cadaver bag”
per hospital policy.23 When the security guard arrived at the holding room to
help the nurse bring the babies to the morgue, she had still not finished putting
the tags on the babies.24 Although he had never done so before, the security
guard began tagging the babies, but apparently swapped the tags when
placing them on the babies.25 “The security guard [put] a tag on the outside
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.

780 S.E.2d 118 (Ga. Ct. App. 2015).
Coon v. Med. Ctr., Inc., 780 S.E.2d 118, 120 (Ga. Ct. App. 2015).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Coon, 780 S.E.2d at 120-21.
Id. at 121.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Coon, 780 S.E.2d at 121.
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of the cadaver bag for Coon’s baby, but did not want to ‘fool’ with the tags
on the baby’s body” even though “the nurse repeatedly told [him] that he
[must put] the . . . tags on the [baby’s] body.”26 The people working at the
morgue logged in the wrongly tagged remains and, as such, the wrong baby
was mistakenly released to the funeral home.27
Coon did not discover that the morgue released and the funeral home
buried the wrong baby until the hospital’s chief executive officer contacted
her on February 23, 2011, eleven days after the baby’s funeral.28 Coon might
have made this discovery sooner, but on advice of the funeral home “given
the condition of the remains,” Coon did not view the baby before or after the
service.29 The next day, the baby’s remains were exhumed from the Opelika
cemetery and delivered to a different funeral home in Columbus.30 During
that trip, the funeral director also went to the hospital to retrieve Coon’s
baby.31 However, upon return to the Opelika funeral home, the director found
“that the cadaver bag contained nothing but a blanket.”32 He returned once
more “to the hospital morgue to [collect] Coon’s baby”, where he discovered
that the morgue log book contained no documentation of when “Coon’s baby
or the exhumed baby were returned to the morgue or . . . when the switch
occurred and who was involved.”33 Someone eventually located the baby and
Coon subsequently buried the baby in the Opelika cemetery with the “hospital
pa[ying] the costs associated with the exhumation of the misidentified baby
and the . . . burial of the correct remains.”34
Shortly thereafter, “Coon filed [suit] against the hospital, seeking
damages for emotional distress.”35 “[T]he hospital [then] moved for
summary judgment [on the basis that] Coon’s emotional distress claims failed
under Georgia law because Coon suffered no physical injury or pecuniary
loss and the conduct of the hospital was not intentional, reckless, extreme, or
outrageous.”36 Coon countered with the argument that Alabama law, rather
than Georgia law, applied because she suffered the relevant emotional
distress when “she learned of the hospital’s mistake after the funeral service,
burial, exhumation, and reburial had occurred,” which was in Opelika.37
Furthermore, Coon asserted, “she was not required to prove physical injury,
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Coon, 780 S.E.2d at 121.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 121-22.
Id. at 122.
Coon, 780 S.E.2d at 122.
Id.
Id.
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pecuniary loss, or intentional or reckless misconduct to support an emotional
distress claim for the mishandling of human remains” under Alabama law.38
Initially, the trial court found that Alabama law would govern the emotional
distress claims and, as a result, denied the hospital’s motion for summary
judgment.39 However, the trial court later revisited the issue and decided that
“application of Alabama law would [violate] Georgia public policy because
Alabama . . . does not [impose] an ‘impact rule’” on plaintiffs seeking
damages for emotional distress arising from “the negligent mishandling of
human remains.”40 Accordingly, the trial court granted summary judgment
in favor of the hospital, finding that Coon’s claim for emotional distress failed
due to the fact that she could not show physical injury, pecuniary loss, or
sufficiently outrageous misconduct by the hospital.41
On appeal, the issue was whether a hospital’s erroneous mislabeling of a
stillborn baby’s remains and delivery of a different stillborn baby to the
funeral home amounted to conduct that was so egregious or outrageous as to
support a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress.42 First, the
appellate court addressed the issue of which state’s laws applied to the
matter.43 “Under Georgia law, choice-of-law issues in tort cases are
controlled by the rule of lex loci delicti, which requires courts to apply the
‘substantive law of the place where the tort or wrong occurred.’”44 Generally,
“the place of the wrong [(i.e., the locus delicti)] is the place where the injury
was suffered rather than the place where the act was committed, or [rather,]
the place where the last event necessary to make an actor liable for an alleged
tort takes place.”45 Pursuant to the rule in Alexander v. General Motors
Corp.,46 under the public policy exception of lex loci delicti, Georgia courts
will not apply the law of the place where the injury was sustained if it would
conflict with Georgia’s public policy.47 Here, the appellate court found that
Georgia law applies to Coon’s claims based on the Georgia public policy.48
Secondly, “under Georgia’s impact rule, ‘recovery for [negligent
infliction of] emotional distress is allowed only where there is some impact
on the plaintiff, and that impact must be a physical injury.’”49 Furthermore,
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Coon, 780 S.E.2d at 122.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 124.
43. Id. at 122.
44. Id. at 122 (citing Int’l. Bus. Mach. Corp. v. Kemp, 536 S.E.2d 303, 306 (Ga. Ct. App. 2000)).
45. Coon, 780 S.E.2d at 122 (citing Risdon Enter. v. Colemill Enter., 324 S.E.2d 738, 740 (Ga. Ct.
App. 1984)).
46. Alexander v. Gen. Motors Corp., 478 S.E.2d 123, 123 (Ga. 1996).
47. Coon, 780 S.E.2d at 123 (citing Alexander, 478 S.E.2d at 123).
48. Id.
49. Coon, 780 S.E.2d at 123 (citing Lee v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co., 533 S.E.2d 82, 86 (Ga. 2000)).
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while Georgia law allows for an exception to pecuniary losses, the exception
only applies to those losses that result from a non-physical injury.50 Here,
Coon herself did not experience physical impact and “the funeral and burial
expenses incurred by Coon were not a direct result of the emotional injury
experienced by [her], but [rather] were the result of having a stillborn child.”51
Accordingly, “the funeral and burial expenses [incurred were] not sufficient
to overcome the impact rule requirement.”52
Lastly, for claims of intentional infliction of emotional distress, a person
must show the following: “‘(1) the conduct at issue was intentional or
reckless; (2) the conduct was extreme and outrageous; (3) there was a causal
connection between the wrongful conduct and the emotional distress; and (4)
the resulting emotional distress was severe.’”53 In order to succeed on an
intentional infliction of emotional distress claim, the character in question
must be “‘so outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go
beyond all [bounds of possible] decency, and to be [considered] atrocious and
utterly intolerable in a civilized community.’”54 The appellate court found
that while the hospital’s conduct was a tragic mistake, it did not rise to the
level of egregiousness or outrageousness necessary to succeed on the claim.55
Therefore, the appellate court affirmed the trial court’s decision to grant
defendant’s motion for summary judgment.56 As noted by others, because
most intentional infliction of emotional distress claims related to human
treatment are unsuccessful, this result is not surprising.57 However, with this
fact pattern, it is virtually inconceivable what a court would consider
egregious or outrageous.58 Such cases are almost guaranteed money-losers
for attorneys and seldom result in the sought-after closure for families.
According to the facts in Shipley v. City of New York,59 on January 9,
2005, seventeen-year-old high school student, Jesse Shipley, “was killed in
an automobile accident in Staten Island, New York.”60 During the autopsy,
the medical examiner removed the brain, “fixed” it in formalin, “labeled with
50. Coon, 780 S.E.2d at 123.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Coon, 780 S.E.2d at 124 (quoting Canziani v. Visiting Nurse Health Sys., Inc., 610 S.E.2d 660,
662 (Ga. Ct. App. 2005)).
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Coon, 780 S.E.2d at 124.
57. See, e.g., Ryan M. Seidemann, How Do We Deal with All the Bodies? A Review of Recent
Cemetery and Human Remains Legal Issues, 3 U. BALT. J. LAND & DEV. 1, 7 (2013).
58. Coon, S.E.2d at 124. In this regard, as the following cases demonstrate, what is considered
egregious must vary widely from one judge to the next, as some of these cases, while rare, are successful.
See supra Section A.
59. 37 N.E.3d 58, 59 (N.Y. 2015).
60. Shipley v. City of New York, 37 N.E.3d 58, 59 (N.Y. 2015).
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decedent’s name and [autopsy date], and placed in a cabinet in the autopsy
room” at Richmond County Mortuary.61 It was routine practice for the
medical examiner “to wait until the cabinet had accumulated at least six
specimens before contacting a neuropathologist . . . who would . . . travel to
Staten Island in order to conduct a[n] examination of the [tissue].”62 Upon
completion of the autopsy, “funeral home personnel retrieved Jesse’s body
and a funeral was held on January 13, 2005.”63
Less than two months later, “[i]n March 2005, forensic science students
from [Jesse’s former] high school were on a field trip to the Richmond
County Mortuary” and saw the specimen jar containing Jesse’s brain during
a tour of the autopsy room.64 The story of this discovery ended up getting
back to Jesse’s sister, who then informed her parents.65
“The Shipleys commenced [an] action against the City of New York and
the Office of the New York City Medical Examiner, . . . alleging negligent
infliction of emotional distress resulting from the display and alleged
mishandling and withholding of their son’s brain.”66 “[The City moved for
summary judgment to dismiss the complaint on the basis that the Shipleys
had failed to state a cause of action.67 “The City argued that the medical
examiner had the authority to conduct the autopsy . . . and that the removal
and retention of the brain by the medical examiner was authorized by law.”68
“The Shipleys [argued] that, even [if] the medical examiner had the authority
to conduct the autopsy, he had ‘mishandled’ [Jesse’s] organs and ‘unlawfully
interfered’ with the Shipleys’ right to [Jesse’s] ‘whole body.’”69 The
Supreme Court denied the City’s motion for summary judgment, reasoning
that they failed to establish that they lawfully retained Jesse’s brain and,
furthermore, “that a question of fact existed as to whether the City interfered
with the Shipleys’ right of sepulcher when it failed to apprise the Shipleys
before their son’s burial that his brain had been removed and was in the
possession of the medical examiner.”70
On appeal, the appellate court held that Jesse’s autopsy was authorized
“because the medical examiner had the statutory authority to exercise his
discretion in performing the autopsy and removing and retaining organs for

61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.

Id. at 59-60.
Id. at 60.
Id.
Id.
Shipley, 37 N.E.3d at 60.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Shipley, 37 N.E.3d at 60.
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further examination and testing.”71 However, that court noted that “the
medical examiner had ‘the mandated obligation, pursuant to Public Health
Law [section] 4215 (1) and the next of kin’s common-law right of sepulcher,
to turn over [Jesse’s] remains to the next of kin for preservation and proper
burial once the legitimate purposes for the retention of those remains [had]
been fulfilled.’”72
Following this appeal, “the case . . . proceeded to trial [to determine]
whether the medical examiner returned [Jesse’s] body to the Shipleys without
informing them that the medical examiner had retained [Jesse’s] brain”.73
Following trial, the lower court awarded “a verdict of one million dollars for
the Shipleys.”74 “The [a]ppellate [d]ivision affirmed the judgment entered
upon the Shipleys’ stipulation to a reduced [damage award].”75
The New York State Court of Appeals granted certiorari on the issue of
whether the common law right of sepulcher imposed a duty on the medical
examiner to notify the family of remains retained for later analysis.76 “The
common-law right of sepulcher affords the deceased’s next of kin an
‘absolute right to the immediate possession of a decedent’s body for
preservation and burial . . . and damages may be awarded against any person
who unlawfully interferes with that right or improperly deals with the
decedent’s body.’”77 “[T]he right of sepulcher is premised on the next of
kin’s right to possess the body for preservation and burial . . . and is geared
toward affording the next of kin solace and comfort in the ritual of burying
or otherwise properly disposing of the body.”78 Therefore, “it is the act of
depriving the next of kin of the body, and not the deprivation of organ or
tissue samples within the body, that constitutes a violation of the right of
sepulcher.”79 Here, Jesse’s body was returned to his family as soon as the
autopsy had been conducted and “was thus made available to the Shipleys for
preservation and burial.”80 The absence of the Jesse’s brain did not prevent
the Shipleys from having possession of the his body nor did it interfere with
their ability to properly dispose of his remains through burial or cremation.81
Thus, the court held that the family received Jesse’s body within a reasonable

71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.

Id. at 61.
Id. (citing N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 4215(1) (McKinney)).
Shipley, 37 N.E.3d at 61.
Id.
Id. at 62.
Id. at 59.
Id. at 63 (citing Mack v. Brown, 82 A.D.3d 133, 137 (N.Y. 2011)).
Shipley, 37 N.E.3d at 63.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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period of time, and as a result, satisfied the family’s ability to provide for a
speedy burial (i.e., the right of sepulcher).82
The fact that the claim of the right of sepulcher was denied is not
surprising, because, as the court correctly noted, the medical examiner
returned the body for burial. What is surprising about this case is that the
court upheld the damage award for the medical examiner’s failure to notify
the family that Jesse’s brain had been removed.83 This decision is contrary
to the general disallowance of emotional distress claims.
According to the facts of the recent New Jersey case, Gately v. Hamilton
Memorial Home, Inc.,84 on October 16, 2009, Kathleen Cousminer and John
M. Gately’s son, John R. Gately, was killed in a car accident.85 Cousminer
and John M. Gately divorced in the 1980s and both remarried.86 The son
lived with Cousminer in New Jersey at the time, and John M. Gately lived in
Florida.87 Following her son’s death, Cousminer and her husband met with a
licensed intern of Cellini Funeral Home to make cremation arrangements.88
Cousminer signed a Cremation Authorization and Disposition Order, which
stated that Cousminer was “‘of mature age and alone [has] the right [to] give
this authorization and direction for said cremation, and that no other person
has such right[.]’”89 Although the arrangements were made without a
licensed funeral director in the room, present in the adjoining room was
director Joe D’Errico.90 Upon completion of the arrangements, Cousminer
spoke with her ex-husband who allegedly informed her that “he did not want
their son to be cremated.91 However, according to testimony, Cousminer
never told the funeral home that “Gately had objected to the cremation.”92
The funeral took place on October 22, 2009, and their son was cremated,
following the services, that same day.93
The father filed suit in August 2011 against the funeral home and the
intern, alleging intentional infliction of emotional distress, negligent
infliction of emotional distress, a claim of punitive damages, and a loss of

82. Id. at 67.
83. Shipley, 37 N.E.3d at 61-62, 67 (noting that the trial resulted in a verdict of one million dollars
to the Shipleys. There was then a stipulation for a reduced award of damages. At present, the New York
State Court of Appeals dismissed the complaint in its entirety.).
84. 125 A.3d 747 (N.J. Super. Ct. 2015).
85. Gately v. Hamilton Mem’l Home, Inc., 125 A.3d 747, 749 (N.J. Super. Ct. 2015).
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Gately, 125 A.3d at 749.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 750.

Published by DigitalCommons@ONU, 2018

9

Ohio Northern University Law Review, Vol. 45 [2018], Iss. 1, Art. 11

10

OHIO NORTHERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 45

consortium.94 The defendants denied any liability and “invoked the immunity
provisions set forth in the New Jersey Cemetery Act,95 and the Mortuary
Science Act (“MSA”).”96 After hearing the case, “[t]he jury returned a
unanimous verdict in favor of defendants as to all counts in the complaint.”97
On appeal, the issue was whether the laws of New Jersey regarding
qualified immunity provisions were intended to cover interns employed in the
funeral business.98 “To become a licensed funeral director in New Jersey, a
person must, among other requirements, ‘complete[] 2 years of practical
training and experience as a registered trainee[.]’”99 According to the
statutory definition, an “‘intern’ is ‘a person registered with the Board who is
engaged in learning to practice as a practitioner of mortuary science under the
supervision of a Board licensee, and includes registered trainees.’”100 The
aforementioned laws “recognize that interns are granted legal authority to
make funeral arrangements,” specifically noting that New Jersey
Administrative Code section 13:36–8.9 “mandates that ‘[n]o unlicensed
person shall be permitted to make funeral arrangements on behalf of any
licensed practitioner of mortuary science, except that interns may make such
arrangements pursuant to N.J.S.A. 45:7–47.’”101 The appellate court found
that interns were encompassed within the term “funeral director” under the
laws of New Jersey and, thus, were qualified by law to engage in funeral
directing.102
The court then looked into whether the father’s objection to cremation
provided “reasonable notice”.103 According to the court, one of the important
functions of those who work in the death care industry is “assuring the proper
disposition of each decedent’s remains, whether by burial or by
cremation.”104 “This time-sensitive function is guided by the previouslyexpressed intentions of the decedent or, in the absence of such instructions,
by the direction of the decedent’s next of kin.”105 Here, the court found “that
where there are two surviving parents, a single parent alone does not have the

94. Id.
95. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 45:27-1.
96. Gately, 125 A.3d at 750 (citing N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 45:7-32 – 45:7-95).
97. Id. at 752.
98. Id. at 752 (citing N.J. STAT. ANN. § 45:27–22(d); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 45:7–95).
99. Id. (quoting N.J. STAT. ANN. § 45:7-49(a)(2)).
100. Id. at 753 (quoting N.J. ADMIN. CODE § 13:36-1.2).
101. Gately, 125 A.3d at 753; see also N.J. STAT. ANN. § 45:7–47 (exempting “registered trainee[s]
working under the direct supervision of a practitioner of mortuary science” from the MSA’s general
licensure requirements).
102. Id. (citing N.J. STAT. ANN. § 45:7–34(c); § 45:7–47; N.J. ADMIN. CODE § 13:36–8.9).
103. Id. at 758.
104. Id. at 754.
105. Gately, 125 A.3d at 754.
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unilateral right to control disposition.”106 However, it also noted that funeral
directors do not have a positive obligation to obtain authorizations from “all
parties who have a right to control disposition,” but rather are allowed to
“proceed with the written authorization provided by a surviving parent who
‘claims to be and is believed to be entitled to make the decision,’ subject to
the ‘reasonable notice’ caveat . . . .”107
In joining the two principles together, the court explained that both the
MSA108 and the Cemetery Act109 “confer qualified immunity for the
disposition of remains in accordance with an authorization received from the
decedent’s next of kin, unless the [funeral director] had ‘reasonable notice’
that the representations made by the surviving relative were ‘untrue’ or that
the person ‘lacked the right to control’ the disposition.”110 When a funeral
director is not “timely provided with ‘reasonable notice’ of disagreement
among the survivors or a lack of valid authority by the relative who is making
the funeral arrangements,” the director is immune from liability for acting in
accordance with the directions given.111 However, “if such ‘reasonable
notice’ [was] expressed but ignored, then the [funeral director] faces potential
liability if the other elements for a cause of action are established.”112 Thus,
the law provides a “limited shield” from liability, “contingent upon whether
there is persuasive proof of reasonable notice.”113
Altogether, the court reasoned that, “from a functional perspective, it
made sense for the statutory immunity to extend to such supervised
interns.”114 This is because without such a shield, funeral homes and funeral
directors would presumably be wary to hire interns . . . or would be reluctant
to delegate tasks to the interns that could spawn future litigation.115 Here, the
court found evidence that the funeral director supervised the intern with
respect to the funeral arrangements.116 Therefore, the court held that the
intern was entitled “to the qualified protection conferred by [New Jersey law],
assuming that ‘reasonable notice’ of the father’s objections to the cremation
had not been provided.”117
The result of this case is logical. Those in the death care industry should
be required to exercise due diligence to ensure they have obtained the proper
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.

Id. at 755.
Id. at 756 (quoting N.J. STAT. ANN. § 45:7–95).
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 45:7–1.
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 45:27–1.
Gately, 125 A.3d at 757 (quoting § 45:7–95; N.J. STAT. ANN. § 45:27–22(d)).
Id. at 758.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Gately, 125 A.3d at 758.
Id.
Id.
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disposition authorizations. However, this requirement does not mandate that
such service providers undertake independent investigation of their clients’
assertions regarding their authority. In other words, when reasonably relying
on the representations of those directing disposition, funeral directors should
not be liable in tort for untruths told by their clients.
The case of Rugova v. City of New York118 raised issues that sound in
both tort and regulatory liability. Briefly, the facts of this case are that on
“April 20, 2008, at about 1:00am, New York City Police Officers . . .
responded to a radio call for an accident on the Bronx River Parkway.”119
Darden Binakaj’s vehicle apparently struck a tree; the impact ejected him
through the sunroof, and emergency medical personnel subsequently declared
him dead on the scene.120 Following this discovery, the police and medical
examiner slowly undertook their standard duties, documenting the site and
performing an autopsy.121 By the time the family learned of Binakaj’s death
some 36-hours later, the medical examiner already performed the autopsy,
which was prohibited by their Islamic faith.122 As the family saw it, the
autopsy damaged Binakaj’s body and violated his and his family’s Muslim
religion and rites.123
In July 2008, the family brought action for
breach of duty to notify them of [Binakaj’s] death, an interference
with their right to immediate possession of the body, the conduction
of an autopsy in the absence of any compelling public necessity, and
the deprivation of the next of kin’s opportunity to claim the body and
object to the performance of the autopsy in violation Public Health
Law [section] 4214 (1).124
The family further asserted that all of the City’s failures and omissions caused
them “serious emotional suffering and distress, anxiety, and mental
anguish.”125 The defendant, City of New York, moved for summary
judgment, arguing that: (1) the police investigation and the handling of
Binakaj’s body by the medical examiner did not result in an actionable claim
due to the plaintiffs’ failure to prove a special relationship with City officials;
(2) the medical examiner did not require consent to perform the autopsy as
the medical examiner deemed the autopsy necessary; and (3) “there was
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.

132 A.D.3d 220 (N.Y. App. Div. 2015).
Rugova v. City of New York, 132 A.D.3d 220, 222 (N.Y. App. Div. 2015).
Id.
Id. at 222-23.
Id. at 224.
Id.
Rugova, 132 A.D.3d at 225 (citing N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 4214(1) (McKinney)).
Id.
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neither an unreasonable passage of time nor an improper burial” so as to
support the family’s claims for negligent interference with Binakaj’s right to
a proper burial.126 The family “cross-moved for partial summary judgment
on the issue of liability with respect to the loss of the right of sepulcher, the
performance of an unauthorized autopsy, and the interference with
[Binakaj’s] right to a proper burial.”127 The trial court granted the City’s
motion in part, granted the family’s cross motion in part, and “dismissed the
family’s claims for negligent performance of an autopsy,” noting that “the
‘authority to conduct an autopsy derives solely from statute.’”128
On appeal, the issue was whether the “36-hour delay in informing the
next of kin that they could take possession of [Binakaj’s] remains caused any
interference with the family’s burial rights” so as to trigger a loss of
sepulcher.129 Under New York law, “the [m]edical [e]xaminer has extensive
authority to perform autopsies within the exercise of professional discretion .
. . including where . . . circumstances indicate that the death was accidental .
. . .”130 Moreover, “compelling public necessity” is only required “where the
[m]edical [e]xaminer has received an objection on religious grounds from a
surviving friend or relative or has reason to believe that an autopsy is contrary
to the decedent’s religious beliefs.”131 Here, the appellate court noted that the
family “obviously could not make such an objection” as to the autopsy
because “they had not been informed of [Binakaj’s] death.”132 However, even
so, “the [m]edical [e]xaminer’s office was not obligated to wait [for] an
objection before performing the autopsy.”133
The common-law right of sepulcher gives the next of kin the absolute
right to the immediate possession of a decedent’s body for preservation and
burial, and damages may be awarded “to the next of kin for the ‘solely
emotional injury’ experienced as a result of the interference with their ability
to properly bury their [loved one]” and “against any person who unlawfully
interfere[d] with that right or improperly deal[t] with the decedent’s body.”134
As explained in Melfi v. Mount Sinai Hospital,135 “[i]nterference can arise
either by unauthorized autopsy or by disposing of the remains inadvertently,

126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 226.
129. Rugova, 132 A.D.3d at 231.
130. Id. at 226 (citing N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW §§ 4210 – 14 (McKinney)).
131. Id. at 226-27 (citing Harris-Cunningham v. Med. Exam’r, 261 A.D.2d 285 (N.Y. App. Div.
1999)).
132. Id. at 227.
133. Id.
134. Kennedy-McInnis v. Biomedical Tissue Servs., 178 F. Supp. 3d 97, 102 (W.D.N.Y. 2016)
(citing Shipley, 37 N.E.3d at 63).
135. Melfi v. Mount Sinai Hosp., 64 A.D.3d 26, 39 (N.Y. App. Div. 2009).
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or . . . by failure to notify the next of kin of the death.”136 The appellate court
here reasoned that the City argued, “that any mental anguish resulting from
the delay in learning of [Binakaj’s death] was minimal,” but such a distinction
goes to the measure of damages, not the overall right of recovery.137 As a
matter of law, this means that just because the family suffered minimal mental
anguish due to the defendants’ failure to notify, does not mean that the family
is precluded altogether from recovering for their suffering.138
According to the court in Tinney v. City of New York,139 “where City
defendants ‘[have] all the necessary identifying documents,’” as to the
decedent and their next of kin, negligence for failure to timely inform the next
of kin of their loved one’s death–was considered a breach of a ministerial
function rather than a discretionary act shielding City defendants from
liability.140 As the appellate court previously held in Melfi, “interference with
the next of kin’s right to immediate possession of a decedent’s body may arise
from the municipality’s failure to notify them of the death presumes a
ministerial duty owed directly to the immediate family.”141 Thus, the court
found that the family had the standing necessary to bring this action and to
claim such damages for the disturbance of the right of sepulcher.142 The
appellate court affirmed the judgment of the lower court, which
denied the City’s motion for summary judgment insofar as it sought
dismissal of [the family’s] claim for the loss of the right of sepulcher,
granted [the family’s] cross motion for partial summary judgment as
to liability on that claim, and granted [the City’s] motion insofar as it
sought summary judgment dismissing [the family’s] claim for
negligent performance of an autopsy . . . .143
In other words, the appellate court held that the family was entitled to recover
for loss of the right of sepulcher, but was not entitled to recover for the
negligent performance of an autopsy.
The result in this case should serve as a cautionary tale for first responders
and medical examiners to make reasonable efforts to notify the family prior
to conducting autopsies that are not absolutely necessary. Certainly, the
result here would have been different if the medical examiner had no
identifying information or if there had been a compelling public policy reason
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.

Rugova, 132 A.D.3d at 230 (citing Melfi, 64 A.D.3d at 39).
Id. at 230.
Id.
Tinney v. City of New York, 94 A.D.3d 417 (N.Y. App. Div. 2012).
Rugova, 132 A.D.3d at 231 (citing Tinney, 94 A.3d at 471).
Id. (citing Melfi, 64 A.D.3d at 31).
Id.
Id.
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to conduct the autopsy. However, the presence of such information and the
lack of a necessity added up to a liability claim essentially for a lack of
compassion.
B. Property Rights and Wrong Spaces
As was set forth in the matter of Kirschner v. Service Corp.
International,144 on April 1, 1979, Jeanine Kane was inurned in a niche in the
columbarium section at Eden Memorial Park Cemetery in Mission Hills,
California, purchased previously by her family.145 Her family recalled the
niche being adjacent to the one in which the remains of the famous comedian
Groucho Marx were inurned.146 In 1985, Service Corporation International
(“SCI”) purchased the cemetery from the former owners.147 When Ms.
Kane’s husband died in 2011, the family went to the cemetery to make
arrangements for the inurnment of his remains.148 When a cemetery
employee showed the family the proposed niche, they noticed that the
indicated niche (the one belonging to their mother) was not the one that they
had recalled.149 In an attempt to resolve the situation, the cemetery showed
the family the file kept for their mother’s inurnment.150 The family noticed
that the original niche number had been crossed out and a different number
now took its place, which concerned them because they believed that to mean
the cemetery moved Ms. Kane’s remains without their permission.151
Cemetery employees explained that questionable things occurred at the
cemetery under the former ownership, but that those individuals no longer
worked there.152 This action, alleging intentional infliction of emotional
distress, negligence, and tortious interference with a dead body, based upon
the supposed unauthorized relocation of Ms. Kane’s remains, resulted.153 In
this case, the family alleged that their suffering resulted from the former
owner’s long-time irresponsibility and tampering in the handling of remains
and that the former owners moved Ms. Kane’s remains to a different niche
due to “its proximity to that of Groucho Marx in order to resell” the former
space for a greater profit.154

144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.

2015 WL 5458336 (Cal. Ct. App. 2015).
Kirschner v. Serv. Copr. Int’l, 2015 WL 5458336, at *1 (Cal. Ct. App. 2015).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Kirschner, 2015 WL 5458336, at *1.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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The cemetery presented records—going back for years prior to Ms.
Kane’s inurnment—showing that another family purchased the interment
right for the space that Ms. Kane’s family thought was hers.155 Further
records showed that, some two years before Ms. Kane’s inurnment, someone
else purchased the interment right for Groucho Marx’s niche.156 Finally, the
cemetery’s records reflected that, on April 1, 1979, Ms. Kane’s family
purchased her interment right for the spot below Groucho Marx’s niche and
four columns to the right.157 As the family stated in their petition, there was,
in fact, a thick vertical strike-out covering what seemed to be a single digit
on the interment records.158 The purchaser index card also reflected the
purchase of Row E, Niche 15, where plaintiffs’ mother was inurned on June
3, 1979.159 Contrary to the family’s allegations, there was no premium paid
for any of the inurnment rights near Groucho Marx, but rather $275 for
families who purchased rights in Rows E and F and $300 for those who
purchased in Rows G and H.160
Plaintiff, Stephanie Kirschner, stated that she went to her mother’s niche
“twice in 1979 and once in June 1981,” but did not return until 2011 when
she was making plans for her father’s disposition.161 Plaintiff, Brad Kane,
said that he visited the niche twice in 1979 and once in 1982, but that he also
did not return until 2011.162 Kane also explained that “he had a strong
memory of a visit in 1982 after hearing a report that the remains of Groucho
Marx’s had been stolen . . .,” and that when he visited his mother’s niche, he
noticed a new nameplate welded directly above Marx’s niche in order to
prevent future thefts.163 The trial court granted the cemetery’s motion for
summary judgment finding that the evidence was overwhelming that the
family’s mother was buried in one location at all relevant times and that there
was no evidence that she was ever moved or that she was ever in any place
other than Row E, Niche 15.164 The family appealed.165
On appeal, the issue was whether the trial court erred in granting the
cemetery’s motion for summary judgment and whether the testimony and
evidence presented by the plaintiffs that the cemetery relocated Ms. Kane’s
remains from one niche to another was sufficient to raise a triable issue of
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.

Kirschner, 2015 WL 5458336, at *1.
Id. at *2.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Kirschner, 2015 WL 5458336, at *2.
Id.
Id.
Id. at *3.
Id. at *4.
Kirschner, 2015 WL 5458336, at *4.
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fact.166 The appellate court noted that, in ruling on a summary judgment
motion, “the trial court determine[d] only whether triable issues of fact
existed,” but it was not the court’s duty to resolve those issues.167 “‘If any
evidence or interference therefrom show[ed] or implie[d] the existence of the
required element(s) of a cause of action [or defense], the court must deny a .
. . motion for summary judgment or summary adjudication because a
reasonable trier of fact could find for the [opposing party].’”168 Here, the
appellate court found a great deal of evidence that cast doubt on the
recollections of Ms. Kane’s family.169 Although the court appeared to lean
towards finding the cemetery’s evidence sufficient to show that there was no
mistake as to the location of Ms. Kane’s remains, the court determined that
the matter needed to go to trial in order for a fact-finder to properly hear the
testimony and make a judgment on the merits.170
Although the issue concluded procedurally, with the court finding that a
summary proceeding was not the proper mechanism through which to decide
this matter and remanding the matter to the district court for more testimony
evidence, the appellate court did note that no documentation existed in the
record that demonstrated that anything out of the ordinary happened to Ms.
Kane’s remains.171 Instead, the appellate court largely chalked the dispute up
to a misremembering by the family that brought the lawsuit.172
The other important issue in this case is the question of how long can
someone wait to bring one of these claims. The mother in this case was
placed in this mausoleum in 1979 and the plaintiffs waited to bring this more
than thirty year later.173 The defendants in this case argued that the family
waited too long, but the court rejected that argument and said that the right to
bring a suit like this begins to run from the time that someone has knowledge
of the problem.174 Further, the court stated that there is no obligation for
someone to visit their loved one in a cemetery at regular intervals, so the fact
that these plaintiffs may not have visited their mother’s grave in more than
thirty years did not impact their ability to bring this case.175 Such a ruling is
important because cemetery complaints often occur many years after

166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.

Id.
Id. at *5 (citing EHP Glendale, LLC v. Cty. of L.A., 193 Cal. App. 4th 262, 270 (2011)).
Id. (quoting Smith v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 135 Cal. App. 4th 1463, 1474 (2005)).
Id.
Kirschner, 2015 WL 5458336, at *5.
Id. at *6.
Id. at *5.
Id. at *3.
Id. at *6.
Kirschner, 2015 WL 5458336, at *6.
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interment. The court here is consistent with other legal concepts such as
contra non valentum.176
The property rights at issue in City of Sandy Springs v. Mills,177 relate to
the legal effect of the cemetery dedication.
On February 20, 1900, John S. Heard executed a deed in favor of
about eight named individuals [including Carl Heard] to a one-acre
tract of land, for the purposes of [creating] a family burial ground and
to be used for said purposes only. . . . A tax deed shows that on
December 5, 2006, the acre tract was sold at a sheriff’s sale for
delinquent property taxes, the grantors being “Carl C. Heard, Jr. and
Mary H. Ellis, (“Owners”) by and through . . . the Sheriff.” The tax
deed was filed and recorded on January 10, 2007.178
*

*

*

On December 21, 2007, “MARY H. ELLIS A.K.A. MARY ANN
ELLIS ELSNER” executed an “Affidavit of Descent,” stating that
her sibling Carl C. Heard, Jr., had died intestate on June 15, 1992,
had never married and had no children, and all of the debts of his
estate had been fully paid. That same day, “MARY H. ELLIS A.K.A.
MARY ANN ELLIS ELSNER, individually and as Sole Surviving
Heir of CARL C. HEARD JR.” executed in favor of Henry Cline an
“Assignment of Rights for Tax Parcel” regarding the acre tract.
Further, “MARY H. ELLIS A.K.A. MARY ANN ELLIS ELSNER .
. . INDIVIDUALLY AND AS THE SOLE SURVIVING HEIR OF
CARL C. HEARD, JR. DECEASED” executed a quitclaim deed,
conveying the acre tract to Cline “for and in consideration of the sum
of TEN AND 00/100 ($10.00) Dollars and other good and valuable
consideration.”179
In addition to the quitclaim,

176. Doctrine of contra non valentem, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
The common-law rule that a limitations or prescriptive period does not begin to run against a
plaintiff who is unable to bring an action, usu. because of the defendant’s culpable act, such as
concealing material information that would give rise to the plaintiff’s claim. — Often shortened
to contra non valentem . . . .
Id.
177. 771 S.E.2d 405, 408 (Ga. Ct. App. 2015).
178. Id. at 406.
179. Id. at 406-407.
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Cline paid the redemption price to the entity that had purchased the
property in the tax sale, and that entity. . . “in turn issued a quitclaim
deed in favor of Carl C. Heard, Jr. and Mary H. Ellis, who had already
quitclaimed their purported interest in the Property to Mr. Cline.” On
July 31, 2012, Cline conveyed the property by quitclaim deed to his
daughter and her husband, Christopher Mills, “for and in
consideration of the sum of ONE AND NO/100 U.S. Dollars
($1.00).”
In December 2011, Mills and his wife initiated communication with
the City about building a single-family residence on the “raw land”
portion of the property or, in other words, that portion of the acre tract
upon which there were no graves. It [wa]s undisputed that twenty or
more human graves were situated on the property, “neatly arranged
in clusters and rows,” that the graves covered approximately 0.20
acres of the northwestern portion of the acre tract, and that the most
recent human burial identifiable on the tract had occurred in 1971.
The City declined to issue Mills a residential single-family building
permit, on the basis that the acre lot was encumbered by a “cemetery
use restriction,” and would not be permitted for any other use. In
August 2012, Mills [instituted this lawsuit] for declaratory judgment,
naming the City as the defendant, and asserting that, for various
reasons, the restriction on the use of the entire acre tract as a family
burial ground was no longer enforceable or, alternatively, that the
City had “effectuated a taking of the Property by enforcing an
unenforceable restriction covenant, . . . entitling Mills to just
compensation.”180
The City answered, “denying therein the ‘existence of a cause of action
for which Mills would have redress before court to seek a declaratory
judgment.’”181 Following the answer, the City and the purported descendants
asked the trial court to,
grant summary judgment in their favor regarding Mills’s complaint
“on the ground that the Heard Family Cemetery has been perpetually
dedicated as a private burial ground and, therefore, [Mills] cannot
appropriate it for any other purpose, including constructing a single
family residence.” The City and the purported descendants
“[a]dditionally” sought a “declaratory judgment that legal title to
Heard Family Cemetery rests in the hands of . . . John Heard’s heirs
180. Id. at 407.
181. Id.
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as descended through the individuals named in the February 20, 1900
deed, which perpetually established Heard Family Cemetery as a
private burial ground”; the appellee challenged the validity of the tax
sale and deed.182
“The trial court denied the motion for summary judgment, concluding
that ‘alleged descendants of a prior owner of the Property’ had an ‘easement
in the Cemetery Limits.’”183 This result is consistent with other such cases,
finding that the cemetery dedication is not tantamount to ownership in fee,
but rather is a restriction on the use of property.184 However, the trial court’s
recognition of the transfer of the property by tax title is in conflict with
general principles of cemetery law, which forbids the seizure and sale of
property in which human remains are interred.185
The main issue on appeal was whether the trial court erred in holding that
material issues of fact existed when the trial court determined whether
defendant actually “abandoned” portions of Heard Cemetery.186 The court
rightly recognized that, “[w]hen a family burial plot is established, it creates
an easement against the fee, and while the naked legal title may pass, it passes
subject to the easement [so] created.”187 The court noted that, “[t]he easement
and rights created thereunder survive until the plot is abandoned either by the
person establishing the plot or his heirs, or by removal of the bodies by the
person granted statutory authority.”188 For a cemetery to be deemed
“abandoned,” it must show signs of neglect including: “unchecked growth of
vegetation, repeated and unchecked acts of vandalism, or the disintegration
of grave markers or boundaries and for which no person can be found who is
legally responsible and financially capable of the upkeep of such
cemetery.”189 This characterization of the elimination of the cemetery
dedication seems to derive from Jackson’s writings in the 1930s and is cited
by other courts.190 However, it is an incorrect interpretation of the law and

182. City of Springs, 711 S.E.2d at 407.
183. Id.
184. See, e.g., Huxfield Cemetery Ass’n v. Elliott, 698 S.E.2d 591, 594 (S.C. 2010) (citing 14 AM.
JUR. 2D Cemeteries § 17).
185. See, e.g., In re Provident Gen. Corp., 32 B.R. 594, 594 n.1 (Bankr. W.D. La. 1983) (citing the
Louisiana law holding cemeteries exempt from most taxation); Rosedale Cemetery Ass’n. v. Linden, 63
A. 904, 905 (N.J. 1906) (noting that New Jersey law exempts most cemetery lands from taxation).
186. City of Sandy Springs, 771 S.E.2d at 408.
187. Id. at 408 (citing Walker v. Ga. Power Co., 339 S.E.2d 728, 730 (Ga. Ct. App. 1986)).
188. Id.
189. Id. (citing GA. CODE ANN. § 36–72–2(1) (2018)).
190. Ryan M. Seidemann, Requiescat in Pace: The Cemetery Dedication and its Implications for
Land Use in Louisiana and Beyond, 42 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 895, 910-11 (2018)
(quoting PERCIVAL E. JACKSON, THE LAW OF CADAVERS AND OF BURIALS AND BURIAL PLACES 206
(1936)).
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represents bad precedent.191 The historical sources of the cemetery dedication
do not condition the dedication on whether the land is kept clean.192 The only
inquiry should be whether human remains, once interred or entombed, are
removed from the property.193 If not, the land is still dedicated.194 The court
missed the mark here, presumably by relying on Jackson or other sources that
relied on his work.
“None of the descendants had averred in their affidavits that they were
legally responsible and financially capable of the upkeep of such
cemetery.”195 “The trial court found (and the evidence showed) . . . that Cline
maintained the property after he purchased it in the tax sale, the undeveloped
portion of the acre tract contained mature trees, and there were ‘remnants’ of
a fence that appeared to have enclosed the cemetery.”196 As such, there was
evidence that the descendants abandoned the one-acre tract of land that had
been conveyed for the purposes of a family burial ground, and Mills met his
burden on summary judgment by pointing to specific evidence giving rise to
a triable issue of fact.197 Thus, the court found that, “the trial court did not
err by denying the appellants’ motion for summary judgment as to Mills’
complaint for declaratory judgment.”198
The recent Mississippi case of McGriggs v. McGriggs199 considered
issues related to the disinterment of the dead from a particular tract.
According to this case, on January 22, 2014, Alfred McGriggs passed
away.200 Three days later, he was buried on family land in Claiborne County,
Mississippi, in accordance with his wishes.201 “One of Alfred’s twelve
siblings, Lee McGriggs, Sr., objected to Alfred’s body being interred in the
family land.”202 Lee subsequently filed suit to exhume his brother’s body,
naming two of his siblings as defendants.203 Lee alleged that they buried
Alfred in “‘violation of the cemetery laws of the State of Mississippi’” and
that his body should be exhumed and moved to the Seven Star Cemetery in
Utica and buried where the siblings’ parents are.204 However, five of Alfred’s
siblings uncontradicted testimony stated Alfred wanted to be buried on his
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.
199.
200.
201.
202.
203.
204.

Id. at 911.
Id.
Id. at 914.
Id.
City of Sandy Springs, 771 S.E.2d at 408.
Id.
Id. at 408-09 (citing GA. CODE ANN. §§ 36–72–2(1); 9–4–6 (2018)).
Id. at 409.
192 So. 3d 350, 352 (Miss. Ct. App. 2015).
McGriggs v. McGriggs, 192 So. 3d 350, 351 (Miss. Ct. App. 2015).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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family’s land in Claiborne County.205 The trial judge determined that
Alfred’s burial did not violate state law and therefore denied Lee’s petition.206
On appeal, the overarching issue was whether sufficient evidence of an
illegal burial on family land existed to warrant disturbing a decedent’s
remains.207 The court specifically analyzed whether it was illegal to inter a
body on private property without the authorization of a county board of
supervisors.208 The law,209 on which Lee’s argument relied, did not give the
board of supervisors the power to prevent the establishment of a private
family cemetery.210 Rather, the law “‘gives the board the authority to
establish or designate the location of a private family cemetery when
petitioned and requested to do so.’”211 The court reasoned that, while a
property owner may want to file such a petition in order to get a property tax
exemption, the “interment of a body on private property does not require that
a landowner petition for the permission of the board of supervisors.”212 As
the court noted, citing the case of Hood v. Spratt,213 there exists a strong
presumption against the removal of human remains.214 When considering the
place of interment of a decedent, a court may look at the preferences of the
next of kin in order of their relation to the decedent, which order may be
“modified by circumstances of special intimacy or association with the
decedent.”215 The court in Hood, consistent with the law of most states,
explained that the “surviving spouse has the paramount right to designate the
burial site . . . [but] in the absence of a surviving spouse, the right goes to the
next of kin in order of their relation to the decedent.”216 The Hood court
recognized factors that a court should consider in allowing disinterment and
removal of a body, including:
public interest, wishes of the decedent, rights and feelings of those
entitled to be heard by reason of relationship, rights and principles of
religious bodies or other organizations that granted interment in the
first burial site, and whether consent was given to interment in the
first burial site . . . by the one claiming the right of removal.217
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.
210.
211.
212.
213.
214.
215.
216.
217.

McGriggs, 192 So. 3d at 352.
Id. at 353.
Id.
Id.
MISS. CODE. ANN. § 41-43-1 (2018).
McGriggs, 192 So. 3d at 353-54 (citing 96 Miss. Op. Att’y Gen. 0077 (1996), 1996 WL 88818).
Id.
Id. at 354 (citing MISS. CODE. ANN. § 27-31-1 (2018)).
Hood v. Spratt, 357 So. 2d 135, 137 (Miss. 1978).
McGriggs, 192 So. 3d at 354 (citing Hood, 357 So. 2d at 137).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 354-55.
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Courts are to take these factors into account when making determinations
regarding disinterment, along with regard to public welfare, the wishes of the
decedent, and the rights and feelings of those entitled to be heard by reason
of relationship or association.218
In this case, the court found that because the desires of the decedent as to
the place of burial usually prevail over the objections of any person,
especially when the decedent’s wishes are strongly and recently expressed,
there was no legal basis for exhuming Alfred’s remains.219 Here, five of Lee’s
siblings presented uncontradicted testimony that Alfred wanted to be buried
exactly where he was and Lee failed to present any evidence sufficient to
show otherwise.220 While Lee and Alfred were brothers, there was clearly no
close connection between them like there was between Alfred and the five
defendant siblings.221 According to the law, the next of kin most closely
related to the decedent controls the right to burial.222 In this situation, the
next closest sibling to Alfred followed his brother’s desire to be buried on the
property in Claiborne County.223 Moreover, emphasizing the Hood factors,
there was no public interest in removing Alfred’s body from his preferred
place of burial on private property.224 The court denied Lee’s petition and
affirmed the judgment of the lower court due to the fact that Lee failed to
meet his burden of proof to present evidence sufficient to justify the
extraordinary relief sought.225 This result is the proper one under the law and
circumstances, and it seems like preserving a higher property value of coowned land interested Lee McGriggs more than protecting his brother’s
eternal rest.
C. Regulatory Issues and Liability
Cases in recent years reveal that regulators of the death care industries
face several interesting situations. The cases reported here are a few
examples of the risks and pitfalls of being a regulator or government actor in
that industry, as well as some of the recurring themes of situations in which
private parties attempt to seek retribution against regulators for lawfully
carrying out their job duties.

218.
219.
220.
221.
222.
223.
224.
225.

Id. at 355.
McGriggs, 192 So. 3d at 355 (citing Hood, 357 So. 2d at 137).
Id.
Id.
Id. (citing Hood, 357 So. 2d at 137).
Id.
McGriggs, 192 So. 3d at 355
Id. at 356.
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The first of these cases is the matter of Newton v. SCI Texas Funeral
Services, Inc.226 This Texas case addresses the liability of both employers
and regulatory bodies when allegations of defamation are made. In this case,
“SCI Texas Funeral Services employed Lisa Newton as a funeral director at
its Forest Park East Funeral Home [location] in Webster, Texas.”227 In
addition to regular funeral director duties, “SCI paid [their] directors a 10%
commission on each flower sale” in an effort to “encourage [their] directors
to actively sell floral arrangements” supplied by a local vendor.228 Directors
were supposed to complete the order forms, fax the forms to the vendor, and
then afterwards, they were to total the orders and attach the forms to their
weekly time sheets in order to claim the commission for their sales.229 In
early 2010, an internal SCI audit identified discrepancies in the employees’
flower order forms, which prompted a thorough internal audit of all funeral
contracts, order forms, employee timesheets, and invoices from the local
flower vendor.230 “The audit revealed that several Forest Park East
employees [including Newton] had committed fraud by submitting duplicate
flower orders, altering flower order forms, and ordering flowers that families
did not pay for in order to receive a higher bonus than was actually due.”231
The audit found that Newton received $225 dollars in bonuses of which she
was not due.232 Upon this discovery, SCI went to the Webster Police
Department with the findings from the audit report.233 Based upon this
information, the Webster Police arrested Newton and charged with a
misdemeanor offense of theft, which was subsequently dismissed.234 Newton
later filed suit against SCI alleging defamation, malicious prosecution,
intentional infliction of emotional distress, and breach of contract.235 SCI
then moved for summary judgment on Newton’s claims, which the trial court
granted except for the motion as to Newton’s breach of contract claim.236
On appeal, the main issue was whether SCI’s act of presenting evidence
of fraud to the Webster Police Department constituted defamation against
Newton.237 In order to prove a cause of action for defamation, a plaintiff must
prove that: “(1) the defendant published a statement of fact about the plaintiff;
226. No. 01-13-01065-CV, 2015 WL 1245583, at *1 (Tex. App. 2015).
227. Newton v. SCI Texas Funeral Servs., Inc., No. 01-13-01065-CV, 2015 WL 1245583, at *1
(Tex. App. 2015).
228. Id.
229. Id.
230. Id.
231. Id.
232. Newton, 2015 WL 1245583, at *1.
233. Id.
234. Id.
235. Id.
236. Id.
237. Newton, 2015 WL 1245583, at *2.
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(2) the statement was defamatory; (3) the statement was false; (4) the
defendant acted negligently in publishing the false and defamatory statement;
and (5) the plaintiff suffered damages as a result.”238 “For a statement to be
actionable as defamation, it must refer to an ascertainable person,”239 and the
“statement must ‘point to the plaintiff and to no one else.’”240 “Defamatory
statements are conditionally or qualifiedly privileged and therefore not
actionable when ‘made in good faith on any subject matter in which the
author has an interest, or with reference to which he has a duty to perform to
another person having a corresponding interest or duty.’”241 This type of
privilege applies to statements made in circumstances where the author
believes that the information is of important interest to the public or the public
is entitled to know the information.242 There is one exception to the
defamation claim: actual malice.243 “[P]roof that a statement was motivated
by actual malice existing at the time of publication defeats the privilege.”244
For defamation purposes, “a statement is made with actual malice when it is
made with knowledge of its falsity or with reckless disregard as to its
truth.”245 To invoke a privilege, “an employer must conclusively establish
that the allegedly defamatory statement was made [without] malice.”246
In this case, the court found that SCI only furnished the internal audit
report to the police with the intent to seek law enforcement assistance in
determining whether the police believed that sufficient evidence existed to
bring criminal charges against Newton.247 SCI argued that, it never made any
statement that it knew was false or was made with reckless disregard as to its
truth throughout the police interaction.248 The appellate court found that “SCI
conclusively established that its alleged defamatory statement to the Webster
Police Department was made without malice and, therefore, was qualifiedly
privileged.”249 Malicious prosecution is a type of intentional tort wherein a
plaintiff must prove:
238. Id. at *2 (citing WFAA–TV, Inc. v. McLemore, 978 S.W.2d 568, 571 (Tex. 1998); Brown v.
Swett & Crawford of Texas, Inc., 178 S.W.3d 373, 382 (Tex. App. 2005)).
239. Id. at *3 (citing Robertson v. Sw. Bell Yellow Pages, Inc., 190 S.W.3d 899, 902 (Tex. App.
2006); Double Diamond, Inc. v. Van Tyne, 109 S.W.3d 848, 854 (Tex. App. 2003)).
240. Id. at *3 (citing Newspapers, Inc. v. Matthews, 339 S.W.2d 890, 894 (Tex. 1960)).
241. Id. at *5 (citing TRT Dev. Co.–KC v. Meyers, 15 S.W.3d 281, 286 (Tex. App. 2000)).
242. Newton, 2015 WL 1245583, at *5 (citing Randall’s Food Mkts., Inc. v. Johnson, 891 S.W.2d
640, 646 (Tex. 1995)).
243. Id.
244. Id. (citing Randall’s Food Mkts., Inc., 891 S.W.2d at 646; Marathon Oil Co. v. Salazar, 682
S.W.2d 624, 631 (Tex. App. 1984)).
245. Id. (citing generally Hagler v. Proctor & Gamble Mfg. Co., 884 S.W.2d 771 (Tex. 1994)).
246. Id. (citing Jackson v. Cheatwood, 445 S.W.2d 513, 514 (Tex. 1969); Goodman v. Gallerano,
695 S.W.2d 286, 287–88 (Tex. App. 1985)).
247. Newton, 2015 WL 1245583, at *5.
248. Id.
249. Id. at *6 (citing Jackson, 445 S.W.2d at 514).
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(1) commencement of a criminal prosecution against the plaintiff; (2)
initiated or procured by the defendant; (3) termination of the
prosecution in the plaintiff’s favor; (4) the plaintiff’s innocence; (5)
the defendant’s lack of probable cause to initiate the proceedings; (6)
malice in filing the charge; and (7) damage to the plaintiff.250
In this particular instance, the court paid a great deal of attention to the fifth
element of probable cause.251 Probable cause is defined as, “‘the existence of
such facts and circumstances as would excite belief in a reasonable mind,
acting on the facts within the knowledge of the . . . [complainant], that the
person charged was guilty of the crime for which he was prosecuted.’”252
Essentially, the question here was “whether a reasonable person would
believe that a crime had been committed, given the facts that the complainant,
before initiating the criminal proceedings, honestly and reasonably believed
to be true.”253 When a person “has probable cause to report a crime, there can
be no malicious prosecution, even if the subsequent report fails to fully
disclose all relevant facts.”254 The appellate court found there was no
disputable fact as to whether a reasonable person believed a crime was
committed.255 The undisputed evidence showed that probable cause existed
for SCI to initiate the prosecution of Newton based on:
(1) the internal audit revealed that several Forest Park East
employees were committing fraud by claiming larger amounts of
flower sales than were actually ordered; (2) Newton admitted that she
had submitted duplicate flower order forms and received bonuses that
she was not owed; (3) an SCI employee stated that he honestly and
reasonably believed that Newton had committed theft based on the
facts before him; and (4) Newton understood how SCI could be
concerned about duplicate flower orders.256
Thus, the court found that Newton’s malicious prosecution claim entitled SCI
to summary judgment in its favor.257
The important lesson learned from this case is that when employers and
regulators have a reasonable basis to believe that wrongdoing is occurring,
they should not be subject to a defamation or wrongful prosecution claim for
250. Id. (citing Richey v. Brookshire Grocery Co., 952 S.W.2d 515, 517 (Tex. 1997)).
251. Id.
252. Newton, 2015 WL 1245583, at *6 (quoting Akin v. Dahl, 661 S.W.2d 917, 921 (Tex. 1983)).
253. Id. (citing Richey, 952 S.W.2d at 517).
254. Id. (citing First Valley Bank of Los Fresnos v. Martin, 144 S.W.3d 466, 470 (Tex. 2004)).
255. Id. at *7.
256. Id. at *8.
257. Newton, 2015 WL 1245583, at *8 (citing Richey, 952 S.W.2d at 518–20; Arrendondo v.
Rodriguez, 2011 WL 304070, at *8 (Tex. App. 2011)).
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reporting those suspicions in good faith. This, of course, does not mean that
such claims will never be brought, but it does stand for the notion that they
should not stick.
A common regulatory theme in recent years is the “not in my backyard”
aspect of the siting of funeral homes and crematories. This was the case in
the matter of Scott v. City of Knoxville.258 In this case, in July 2010, Gentry–
Griffey Funeral Home “began the process of applying for a building permit
to add a crematory to its existing funeral home in Fountain City,
Tennessee.”259 The funeral home was located in an O–1 zone, which is
considered to be an “area designated for professional and business offices and
related activities.”260 “On August 23, 2011, the City of Knoxville Building
Inspections and Plans Review Department . . . issued the requested permit to
Gentry–Griffey to construct the crematory as an accessory use of the funeral
home establishment.”261 Presumably because no one particularly likes the
thought of a crematory nearby, in December 2011, several of the city’s
residents appealed the issuance of the permit to the City’s Board of Zoning
Appeals (“BZA”), arguing that the addition of a crematory to the property
should not be allowed because such use is industrial.262 “The BZA voted
unanimously to deny the appeal.”263 The “petitioners then appealed to the
Knoxville City Council.”264 Following a hearing, the City Council permitted
the proposed construction of a crematory as an accessory use for an existing
funeral home.265 Petitioners then filed a petition with the trial court, who later
found “that the City Council had not exceeded its jurisdiction, [followed an
unlawful procedure,] acted illegally, arbitrarily, or fraudulently, or acted
without material evidence to support its decision.”266
The central issue on appeal was whether the erection and operation of a
crematory is considered an “accessory use” of existing funeral home
property.267 Under Tennessee law, “funeral directing” is defined as the
“practice of directing or supervising funerals or the practice of preparing dead
human bodies for burial by any means, other than by embalming, or the
disposition of dead human bodies.”268 The appellate court pointed out that,
in prior jurisprudence, it held that the practice of funeral directing includes
258. No. E2014-01589-COA-R3-CV, 2015 WL 3545948 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2015).
259. Scott v. City of Knoxville, No. E2014-01589-COA-R3-CV, 2015 WL 3545948, at *1 (Tenn.
Ct. App. 2015).
260. Id.
261. Id.
262. Id. at *1, 6.
263. Id. at *1.
264. Scott, 2015 WL 3535948, at *1.
265. Id. at *2, 4.
266. Id. at *4.
267. Id. at *6.
268. Id. at *7 (quoting TENN. CODE ANN. § 62– 5–101(6)(A)(i)).
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the operation of a crematory.269 “Thus, cremation services are customarily
incidental to the operation of an undertaking establishment or funeral
home.”270 Because such activity was incidental to funeral directing, and
Gentry-Griffey was simply trying to provide cremation as an expansion of
the services already offered to customers, the zoning board properly viewed
cremation as an accessory use of the existing facility and did not require a
variance.271 The appellate court ultimately affirmed the trial court’s judgment
holding, “the City Council had not exceeded its jurisdiction or acted illegally,
arbitrarily, or fraudulently” in granting the permit to construct the crematory
as an accessory use of the funeral home establishment.272 This result is not
particularly surprising and likely serves more as a cautionary tale against
wasting money on such challenges, as recent history shows that they seldom
succeed.
The matter of Roman Catholic Diocese of Rockville Center v.
Incorporated Village of Old Westbury273 is a long-term zoning dispute
regarding the siting of a cemetery. In the 1990s, the Diocese in this case
sought zoning approval for the development of a new cemetery.274 The
Village denied the request, taking the position that while religious uses of
land would fit the zoning allowances for the area where the cemetery would
be located, they did not consider a cemetery a “religious use.”275 The
appellate court disagreed with the Village, ruled that a cemetery use of
property is a religious use of land for zoning purposes, and ordered the
Village to issue the Diocese’s zoning permit.276 Although a subsequent
appeal removed the directive to issue the permit,277 the basic ruling
maintained that an authorized use of land as a religious use includes a
cemetery.278 These court machinations lasted from 1994 through 2001.279
Prior to the Diocese’s efforts to move forward with the development of
its cemetery, the Village changed its zoning laws in a manner such that
thwarted the Diocese’s plans to proceed with the development of its
cemetery.280 Among other things, the Village required the Diocese to
269. Scott, 2015 WL 3545948, at *7 (citing BMC Enters. v. City of Mt. Juliet, 273 S.W.3d 619, 626
(Tenn. Ct. App. 2008)).
270. Id.
271. Id.
272. Id. at *7-8.
273. 128 F. Supp. 3d 566, 571 (E.D.N.Y. 2005).
274. Roman Catholic Diocese of Rockville Ctr. v. Inc. Vill. of Old Westbury, 128 F. Supp. 3d 566,
573 (E.D.N.Y. 2005).
275. Id.
276. Id. at 573-74.
277. Id. at 574.
278. Id.
279. Roman Catholic Diocese of Rockville Ctr., 128 F. Supp. 3d at 573-74.
280. Id. at 575, 579.
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undertake prohibitive environmental engineering and monitoring activity in
order to secure its zoning permit.281 In response to the Village’s efforts, the
Diocese challenged the constitutionality of the Village’s new zoning law.282
The court in this matter found that the law was not unconstitutional,283
holding that the law did not violate the establishment of religion clause284 and
that the law met the rational basis standard for regulatory zoning activity.285
Focusing on the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act
(“RLUIPA”), the Diocese argued that the arbitrary nature and
unreasonableness of the terms used in the existing zoning permit and the
terms intended to prevent the Diocese from carrying out its religious
purposes.286 The Village filed a motion for summary judgment on the
Diocese’s RLUIPA claim.287 The court rejected the Village’s efforts to
dismiss the Diocese’ claim under RLUIPA that the establishment of a
cemetery is the free exercise of religion under the First Amendment.288
However, the court dismissed the Diocese’s argument because they lacked
evidence to support that the Village treated them differently from secular
entities with regard to the Village’s zoning activities.289 The court
pretermitted until trial the Village’s efforts to obtain summary judgment on
the allegations that the zoning regulation violated (and was thus superseded
by) RLUIPA, but noted that the Diocese had a strong likelihood of success
on this claim at trial.290
Although this case had other components, the above discussion covers
most of the cemetery-related issues. This case is important because it
highlights the length that certain parties will go to in order to avoid having a
cemetery in their community. However, the court in this matter clearly
telegraphed that unreasonable regulation against such land uses will not be
allowed. Accordingly, because government actions done under color of law
can result in substantial tort liability, this case—though no reported final
resolution exists—should stand as a warning about pushing the aversion to
the dead to extreme lengths.
The United States court system is not the exclusive venue for zoning
problems of late. In the recent British Columbia case of Paldi Khalsa Diwan

281.
282.
283.
284.
285.
286.
287.
288.
289.
290.

Id. at 577-78.
Id. at 571.
Id. at 597.
Roman Catholic Diocese of Rockville Ctr., 128 F. Supp. 3d at 583.
Id. at 584.
Id. at 571, 585.
Id. at 585.
Id. at 587.
Roman Catholic Diocese of Rockville Ctr., 128 F. Supp. 3d at 587, 589.
Id. at 591.
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Society v. Cowichan Valley,291 zoning related to crematory siting was also at
issue. In the 1960’s, at a time when there was no zoning in the Cowichan
Valley, the appellant Crematorium built a wood-fueled crematorium on Lot
1.292 In 1998, the Cowichan Valley Regional District (“CVRD”) passed
Bylaw No. 1840, whereby “[l]ot 1, on which the crematorium already existed,
was included in the newly-created ‘P-1 Zone - Parks and Institutional.’”293
“All of the surrounding properties were zoned ‘R-2 - Suburban
Residential.’”294 In 2010, the crematory “owners applied for and obtained a
building permit for the construction of a gas-fueled crematorium on Lot 1.”295
They completed the building of the new crematorium in late 2010.296
Pursuant to the Cremation, Interment, and Funeral Services Regulation,297 the
crematory operator applied for a license to operate the crematorium in early
2011.298 Although the appellant sought to complete the application to operate
a crematory and the obtain a building permit, confusion arose regarding
whether the permit should actually issue, resulting in this suit.299 The lower
court found that the permitted use of property in the P-1 zone did not include
use as a crematorium.300
The issue on appeal was whether a crematorium may be a permitted as
an “institution” within a parks and institutional zone and if so, whether it may
be operated as a commercial enterprise in the P-1 zone.301 Under the zoning
bylaws, commerce is defined as, “the selling, servicing and repair of goods
or, the provision of services and commercial office functions that are carried
on for the purpose of earning income.”302 The appellate court noted that
nothing in the wording of the P-1 zone prohibited “the provision of services
. . . carried on for the purpose of earning income.”303 On the other hand, the
bylaws defined “institutions” to include cemeteries, arenas, colleges, and
stadiums, which all typically operate by offering services to the public for a
fee, regardless whether on a non-profit or profit basis.304 Furthermore, the
court found no evidence that by providing cremation services, the new
291. 2014 BCCA 335, para. 1 (Can. Br. Col.).
292. Paldi Khalsa Diwan Soc’y v. Cowichan Valley, 2014 BCCA 335, para. 4 (Can. Br. Col.).
293. Id. at para. 5.
294. Id.
295. Id. at para. 6.
296. Id.
297. Cremation, Interment, and Funeral Services Regulation, R.S.B.C. Reg. 298/2004 (Can.).
298. Paldi Khalsa Diwan Soc’y, 2014 BCCA 335, para. 7.
299. See id. at para. 7-10, 14-17.
300. Id. at para. 25.
301. Id. at para. 1, 26.
302. Id. at para. 48 (citing Bylaw No. 1840, Electoral Area “E” - Cowichan Station/
Sahtlam/Glenora Zoning Bylaw (1998)).
303. Paldi Khalsa Diwan Soc’y, 2014 BCCA 335, para. 49.
304. Id. at para. 50.
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crematorium impacted traffic, air pollution, or overall neighborhood
activity.305 Therefore, the appellate court reasoned that the crematorium’s
continued operation as a commercial enterprise in the P-1 zone is a permitted
use.306
It is a bit surprising that the court here did not simply allow the new
crematory to be operated by being a grandfathered use of the property already
burdened with a crematory. Nonetheless, as is usually the case, the court
allowed the crematory to operate.307 While the public often finds such uses
repugnant, they are not, in fact, substantial property burdens nor are they
“industrial” uses in the colloquial sense (i.e., plants and factories, etc.).
In the matter of Simmons v. State,308 the Louisiana Fourth Circuit Court
of Appeal faced matters of regulatory liability when a child in foster care died
and allegations were made by his birth parents of improper handling of the
remains. In February 2013, “the Simmons’ children were removed from the
physical care and control of their parents by [a Louisiana state agency] and
placed in foster care.”309 In April 2013, the agency informed the parents that
someone brought their son, Eli, to Children’s Hospital in New Orleans.310 Eli
died by the time the parents arrived at the hospital.311 The parents filed a
lawsuit alleging, “that the coroner’s office received Eli’s body on April 10,
2013, to perform an autopsy . . . but failed to do so or to provide proper
information as to the cause of death . . . that Eli’s body was misplaced by the
coroner’s office,” and that, despite court orders to the contrary, upon
discovering the body the coroner’s office wrongfully cremated him and
buried his cremains in an undisclosed location.312 The parents asserted that
these alleged acts and omissions of the coroner’s office constituted gross
and/or intentional negligence, as well as intentional infliction of emotional
distress on the family.313 The district court disagreed, finding “[t]he duty
imposed upon the coroner is for the benefit of the public, not a private
individual.”314
On appeal, the issue was whether a coroner may be held liable in tort for
losing a body or for wrongful cremation.315 Specifically, in this case, the

305.
306.
307.
308.
309.
310.
311.
312.
313.
314.
315.

Id. at para. 51.
Id. at para. 52.
Id. at para. 52.
171 So. 3d 1147, 1149 (La. Ct. App. 2015).
Simmons v. State, 171 So. 3d 1147, 1149 (La. Ct. App. 2015).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Simmons, 171 So. 3d at 1150.
See id. at 1153.
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coroner’s office relied on decisions rendered in two other cases316 in which
the courts concluded that “no cause of action [may lie] against the coroner’s
office because ‘the duty statutorily imposed upon the coroner is for the benefit
of the sovereign, and not the private individual or the individual’s private
interest.’”317 However, the court in this case disagreed, explaining that the
conclusions in Lejuene and Sharp are contrary to the statutory language found
in Louisiana Revised Statutes section 13:5713(L)(3), that “states the
coroner’s immunity is limited to only those activities within the course and
scope of his duties that are reasonably related to legitimate government
objectives . . . and should not be construed ‘to reestablish any immunity based
on the status of sovereignty.’”318 Furthermore, the court here found that a
coroner’s immunity does not extend to acts or omissions that constitute
“willful, outrageous, reckless, or flagrant misconduct.”319 Here, the court
found that the parents’ allegations provided clear evidence of outrageous and
flagrant misconduct by the coroner’s office, specifically in the office’s failure
to investigate the incident, perform an autopsy, and provide information as to
Eli’s cause of death.320 Moreover, the court held that the coroner’s office’s
act of losing Eli’s body and then cremating and burying his remains without
notifying the family supported claims of both negligence and intentional
infliction of emotional distress.321
According to Louisiana law, “[a] coroner is statutorily required to
investigate the cause and manner of death in all cases involving . . .
‘suspicious, unexpected, . . . unusual, . . . [s]udden, or violent deaths. . . . [or]
[a]ny death from natural causes occurring in a hospital under twenty-four
hours of admission.’”322 “As part of his investigation, the coroner has the
discretionary authority to perform an autopsy and ‘may hold any dead body
for any length of time that he deems necessary.’”323 Here, Eli’s death
occurred shortly after his admission to the hospital, which clearly warranted
an investigation or autopsy by the coroner.324 This failure to conduct an
autopsy serves to establish the first two elements of a negligence claim (i.e.,
duty and breach of duty).325 Likewise, the coroner’s misplacement of Eli’s
body for nine months and the subsequent wrongful cremation and burial
316. Sharp v. Belle Maison Nursing Home, Inc., 960 So. 2d 166, 169 (La. Ct. App. 2007); LeJeune
v. Causey, 634 So. 2d 34, 37 (La. Ct. App. 1994).
317. Simmons, 171 So. 3d at 1152 (quoting LeJeune, 634 So. 2d at 37; Sharp, 960 So. 2d at 169).
318. Id. at 1153 (quoting LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13:5713(L)(2)(c)).
319. Id. (quoting § 13:5713(L)(2)(b)).
320. Id.
321. Id.
322. Simmons, 171 So. 3d at 1151 (quoting § 13:5713(A)).
323. Id. (quoting § 13:5713(B)).
324. Id. at 1153.
325. Id.
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without notification to the family—which prevented them from conducting
an independent autopsy or providing a burial according to their religious
beliefs—clearly proves the remaining elements of a negligence claim (i.e.,
cause-in-fact, scope of liability, and damages).326
While a coroner does have the statutory power to hold a body for as long
as he deems proper, an abuse of that power, which the court found in this
situation, constitutes the first element necessary for an intentional infliction
of emotional distress claim (i.e., extreme and outrageous conduct).327
Because the family was also deprived of a religious burial of their child and
they still had not been provided with the location of his remains, the second
element (i.e., severe emotional distress) was met.328 Lastly, because the
family constantly notified the coroner’s office as to their wishes to preserve
Eli’s body, the coroner’s actions indicate that the coroner knew or should
have known that the acts or omissions of his office would inflict severe
emotional distress upon the parents (which is the last element for a claim of
intentional infliction of emotional distress).329 Therefore, the appellate court
reversed the trial court’s judgment and instead found that the parents
“sufficiently allege[d] causes of action for negligence and intentional
infliction of emotional distress.”330
This case stands as an extreme example of outrageous conduct that may
be recoverable in tort when the mistreatment of dead bodies is alleged. As
noted by authors previously,331 claims of emotional distress, while often
alleged, are seldom successful.332 This case is an exception to that rule largely
because of its outrageous facts. This case should serve as a warning to
regulators and government actors not to neglect legitimate requests and
complaints from the public, especially those of descendants and family.
Immunity is not certain and regulators and government actors need to be
cautious of careless or wantonly callous actions when interacting with the
public.
The recent California case of Crawford v. Moore333 stands as a polar
opposite of the Simmons case from a regulatory standpoint. Whereas
Simmons represents outrageous behavior by government actors, the Crawford
case represents government actors doing their jobs properly and being sued

326. Id.
327. Simmons, 171 So. 3d at 1153-54 (quoting § 13:5713(B)(3); citing White v. Monsanto Co., 585
So. 2d 1205, 1209-10 (La. 1991)).
328. Id. at 1154.
329. Id. (citing White, 585 So. 2d at 1209).
330. Id. at 1154.
331. Seidemann, supra note 57, at 7.
332. Id.
333. No. 2:14-cv-2725 JAM AC(PS), 2015 WL 1637993, at *1 (E.D. Cal. 2015).
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for acting reasonably.334 This case centers around individuals already
working in the funeral industry as apprentice funeral directors in 1999 when
they were grandfathered into the system as funeral directors due to work
experience.335
In this case, Crawford worked in the funeral industry for nearly fourteen
years before applying for a funeral director’s license.336 When he applied for
the license, he was denied by the California Cemetery and Funeral Bureau
(“CFB”) due to his past criminal convictions.337 Crawford alleged that the
CFB has racially discriminatory policies, practices, procedures, and
administrative regulations, and that Lisa Moore, the CFM Chief and
defendant in this case, denied him a funeral license because he is African
American.338 An administrative law judge accepted Crawford’s application
and advised him that he would issue his license upon the successful
completion of the funeral director exam, with the additional requirement that
he be put on probation for three years.339 On appeal, the issue was whether
any of the causes of action alleged against CFB were actually viable in a
license denial suit.340
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 “prohibits employers,
employment agencies, and labor unions from discriminating on the basis of,
among other things, race or color.”341 “Title VII prohibits both intentional
discrimination (known as ‘disparate treatment’) as well as, in some cases,
practices that are not intended to discriminate but in fact have a
disproportionately adverse effect on minorities (known as ‘disparate
impact’).”342 Although he urged violations of this law, the court found that
“[Crawford did] not state a Title VII claim against the sole defendant, Moore,
because Moore [was] not alleged to be [Crawford]’s employer (nor [was] she
alleged to be an employment agency or a labor union).”343 “Rather, Moore
was the head of a licensing agency, and allegedly discriminated against
Crawford while working in that capacity.344 “Title VII does not apply to
licensing agencies in their role of granting or denying licenses.”345 Because
334. Simmons, 171 So. 3d at 1153; see also Crawford v. Moore, No. 2:14-cv-2725 JAM AC(PS),
2015 WL 1637993, at *6 (E.D. Cal. 2015).
335. Crawford, 2015 WL 1637993, at *1.
336. Id.
337. Id.
338. Id.
339. Id.
340. Crawford, 2015 WL 1637993, at *4.
341. Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2).
342. Id. (citing Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 577 (2009)).
343. Id.
344. Id.
345. Crawford, 2015 WL 1637993, at *4 (citing Haddock v. Bd. of Dental Exam’rs of California,
777 F.2d 462, 463 (9th Cir. 1985)).
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Crawford acknowledged that, “Moore was never his employer . . . his Title
VII claim against her could not be cured,” and the court dismissed his
claim.346 Although a Title VII cause of action was not viable, Crawford made
other allegations.347
Under 42 U.S.C. section 1981, “discriminatory private conduct as well as
such conduct taken under color of state law” is prohibited.348 “To state a
prima facie case under [s]ection 1981, a plaintiff must allege, at a minimum,
facts showing that: (1) he is a member of a protected class; (2) he attempted
to contract for certain services; and (3) he was denied the right to contract for
those services.”349 “‘[T]he prohibition on discrimination by a state or its
officials contained in [section] 1981 can be enforced against state actors only
by means of [section] 1983,’ and thus, [s]ection 1981 ‘does not create a
private right of action’ against state actors.”350 Since the court barred this
claim as a matter of law, they dismissed Crawford’s claim under this law with
prejudice.351
Section 1983 “creates a cause of action against a person who, acting
under color of state law, deprives another of rights guaranteed under
the Constitution.” “In order to allege a claim upon which relief may
be granted under § 1983, a plaintiff must show that he or she has been
deprived of a ‘right secured by the Constitution and . . . law of the
United States’ and that the deprivation was ‘under color’ of state
law.”352
Here, Crawford alleged a “of his Due Process and Equal Protection
Rights.” The court observed that,
Pursuant to the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to
the U.S. Constitution, “No State shall . . . deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law.” “A section 1983
claim based upon procedural due process thus has three elements: (1)
a liberty or property interest protected by the Constitution; (2) a
deprivation of the interest by the government; (3) lack of process.” .
..

346.
347.
348.
349.
350.
351.
352.

Id. (citing Schmier v. Ninth Cir., 279 F.3d 817, 824 (9th Cir. 2002)).
Id. at *5.
Id. at *4 (citing Pittman v. Oregon, Emp’t Dept., 509 F.3d 1065, 1068 (9th Cir. 2007)).
Id. (citing Lindsey v. SLT Los Angeles, LLC, 447 F.3d 1138, 1145 (9th Cir. 2006)).
Crawford, 2015 WL 1637993, at *5 (citing Pittman, 509 F.3d at1068, 1073).
Id. at *4 (citing Schmier, 279 F.3d at 824).
Id. at *5 (internal citations omitted).
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The complaint [did] not state a procedural Due Process claim against
Moore. According to the complaint, [Crawford] applied for a license,
was denied, and was granted a hearing to challenge the denial. The
hearing resulted in a ruling that he would get his license as soon as
he passed the exam, although he would be placed on probation for
three years. Plaintiff does not allege that he was deprived of a
meaningful opportunity to be heard, and he does not indicate what
about this process [wa]s deficient, nor what additional process was
due him.353
Here, Crawford did
not dispute that he was initially denied a license because of his
convictions, but that after a hearing, he was notified that he would be
granted the license—despite the convictions—although he would be
placed on probation for three years. Plaintiff does not allege that this
result is arbitrary and unreasonable, or that it has no substantial
relation to the public health and safety, and it does not appear to be
so on its face.354
Therefore, the court dismissed Crawford’s due process claim.355
Altogether, the court granted CFB’s motion to dismiss for failure to state
a claim, but granted Crawford leave to amend his section 1983 claims arising
under the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process and Equal Protection clauses
of the United States Constitution.356 This case instructs that it is not
unreasonable for a regulatory body to refuse to grant an application when, in
its discretion, the applicant does not meet the requirements for licensure. In
other words, it is not enough for an applicant to allege racial bias when there
is no evidence of such bias and when there is evidence that the regulator
exercised reasonable discretion under the law.
As reported in the recent case of Grassle v. City of Davenport,357 the
Davenport Police Department officer filled out a trespass notice and delivered
it to plaintiff, Douglas Grassle, alleging, based upon the complaint of a
private citizen, (who was also the operator of Oakdale Cemetery)358 that “any
permission or license he had to enter the Oakdale Cemetery—a non-profit
cemetery in Davenport—had been revoked and withdrawn.”359 Grassle then
353.
354.
355.
356.
357.
358.
359.

Id. at *5 (internal citations omitted).
Id. at *6.
Crawford, 2015 WL 1637993, at *6
Id. at *8.
No. 15-0065, 2015 WL 5970055, at *1 (Iowa Ct. App. 2015).
Grassle v. City of Davenport, No. 15–0065, 2015 WL 5970055, at *1 (Iowa Ct. App. 2015).
Id.
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brought suit, alleging that “the notice was illegally issued and was in violation
of his due process rights under the federal and state constitutions.”360 The
district court found that Grassle failed to prove that when the police acted on
the complaint of a private citizen, that the City of Davenport took any action
in violation of Grassle’s due process rights when its police officers acted on
a complaint.361
On appeal, the question was “whether the district court correctly applied
the law in determining that the facts were insufficient to constitute state
action” against the City.362 Per the constitutions of both the United States and
Iowa, state action is limited in that it may not deprive a person of property
without due process of law.363 “In order to be considered a state action, there
must first be a constitutional deprivation caused by the exercise of some right
or privilege created by the state or by a rule of conduct imposed by the state
or a person for whom the state is responsible.”364 Additionally, “[t]he party
charged with the deprivation must also be a person who may fairly be said to
be a state actor.”365 Such:
[a]ction by an individual may constitute state action . . . : (1) where a
state acts directly through its officer or agent; (2) where the state acts
in conjunction with business in a profit-making field; (3) where the
state by its action (or inaction) encourages or creates an atmosphere
in which private citizens deprive others of their constitutional rights;
(4) where the state affirmatively orders or approves the action in the
course of its regulatory rule-making; and (5) where functions
traditionally performed by the state are delegated to or performed by
private interests.366
In this case, the “police officer did not cause or encourage the trespass notice
to be issued, but rather only acted on the request of a private citizen in filling
out and issuing the trespass notice.”367 It was the private citizen who made
the decision to revoke or withdraw Grassle’s permission or license to enter
the cemetery and it was the private citizen who signed his name to the trespass
notice.368 The appellate court agreed with the district court’s finding that
“‘the mere issuance of a trespass notice by a state actor does not rise to the
360. Id.
361. Id.
362. Id.
363. Grassle, 2015 WL 5970055, at *1 (citing Green v. Racing Ass’n of Cent. Iowa, 713 N.W.2d
234, 238 (Iowa 2006)).
364. Id. (citing Am. Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40, 50 (1999)).
365. Id.
366. Id. at *1-2 (citing Jensen v. Schreck, 275 N.W.2d 374, 385 (Iowa 1979)).
367. Id. at *2.
368. Grassle, 2015 WL 5970055, at *2.
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level of state action required to support a due process violation.’”369 Thus,
this case is instructive of the notion that a government entity acting in good
faith pursuant to a complaint from the public should not be in danger of
violating people’s constitutional rights when carrying out its lawful duties.
D. Perpetual Care and Merchandise Issues
In Monument Builders of New Jersey, Inc. v. Roman Catholic
Archdiocese of Newark,370 the plaintiffs were several companies that build,
design, and sell cemetery monuments and mausoleums.371 The “[d]efendant,
the Roman Catholic Archdiocese of Newark, [was] a religious organization
[that] operates ten cemeteries.”372 In 2006, the Archdiocese of Newark
(“Archdiocese”) created a “Private Mausoleum Program” wherein
individuals and families of parish members could be entombed and the
Archdiocese “would own the mausoleum and be responsible for maintenance,
repairs, and restoration.”373 Any money made from the program would be
deposited into a fund to pay for the continual care and upkeep of the
cemeteries.374
“Prior to this program, [the Archdiocese] had never sold monuments
through its cemetery.”375 However, in June 2013, it “began selling inscription
rights for monuments.”376 The program also allowed any person who
purchased an interment right from the Archdiocese to also purchase an
inscription for a headstone.377 However, the Archdiocese informed
purchasers of the interment right that they still had a right to purchase a
monument from any other dealer.378 Also of note is that, “defendant did sell
rights of entombment in one cemetery to individuals from the Coptic Church,
after a decision was made that the Coptic Church [was] ‘in communion’ with
the Catholic Church”—the only exception to the aforementioned parish
members only restriction.379
The plaintiffs sought to “enjoin [the Archdiocese] from selling
monuments, inscriptions of monuments, and private mausoleums in its

369. Id.
370. No. C-124-13, 2015 WL 3843706, at *1 (N.J. Super. Ct. 2015).
371. Monument Builders of New Jersey, Inc. v. Roman Catholic Archdiocese of Newark, No. C124-13, 2015 WL 3843706, at *1 (N.J. Super. Ct. 2015).
372. Id.
373. Id.
374. Id.
375. Id.
376. Monument Builders of New Jersey, Inc., 2015 WL 3843706, at *1.
377. Id.
378. Id.
379. Id.
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cemeteries.”380 The district court rejected the monument dealers’ request.381
On appeal, the plaintiffs argued that the trial court erred when it held that the
Archdiocese “had the statutory authority to sell monuments and inscription
rights, that its cemeteries were private, and that the Program did not violate
public policy.”382 The plaintiffs also argued that the “sale of interment rights
to members of the Coptic Church established [the Archdiocese] as a
‘cemetery company,’” and thus subjected it to additional regulation.383 The
appellate court disagreed with the plaintiffs’ arguments and affirmed the trial
court’s judgment.384
The issue raised by the monument dealers’ action was whether the
Archdiocese had the statutory authority to sell monuments and inscription
rights.385 The New Jersey Cemetery Act:
regulates cemetery companies and defines such a company as ‘a
person that owns, manages, operates, or controls a cemetery, directly
or indirectly, but does not include a religious organization that owns
a cemetery which restricts burial to members of that religion or their
families unless the organization has obtained a certificate of authority
for the cemetery.’386
The statute expressly prohibits cemetery companies from the manufacture or
sale of memorials or private mausoleums.387
The Archdiocese “derives its authority to operate its cemeteries from
[New Jersey law], which allows [it] to manufacture, sell or inscribe
memorials and private mausoleums.”388
Due to the fact that the
Archdiocese’s “cemeteries are restricted to members of the Catholic faith and
their immediate families, those cemeteries are not considered public
cemeteries” under New Jersey law.389 Moreover, the Archdiocese “is not
restricted to holding lands for use as a cemetery, but is permitted to ‘[a]cquire,
purchase, receive, erect, have, hold and use . . . hereditaments suitable for any
or all’ of the purposes of a cemetery.”390 In this case, the court found that
“[t]his broad grant of authority allowed [the Archdiocese] to construct and
380.
381.
382.
383.
384.
385.
386.
45:27–1).
387.
388.
389.
390.

Id.
Monument Builders of New Jersey, Inc., 2015 WL 3843706, at *1.
Id. at *2.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Monument Builders of New Jersey, Inc., 2015 WL 3843706, at *2 (citing N.J. STAT. ANN. §
Id. (citing § 45:27–16c(1)-(2)).
Id. (citing N.J. STAT. ANN. § 16:15–11).
Id. at *3.
Id. (citing § 16:15–11).
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maintain mausoleums, purchase memorials for placement on graves, and sell
inscription rights for memorials.”391
Regarding the argument that the Archdiocese be classified as a cemetery
company due to the burial of Coptics in one of its cemeteries, the court found
that such an arrangement did not invalidate the program.392 New Jersey law393
specifically exempts religious organizations that restrict burial to members of
that religion. The Archdiocese acknowledged that “it sold burial rights in one
of its cemeteries to members of the Coptic Church and did so as an exception
to its otherwise restricted burial policy.”394 “[The Archdiocese] agreed to do
so after its Office of Divine Worship determined that members of the Coptic
faith are in ‘communion with’ the Roman Catholic Church.”395 The court’s
review of the record revealed “no indication that [the Archdiocese] was
otherwise failing to adhere to the religious restriction in the operation of its
cemeteries, and testimony was presented that it was the Archdiocese’s policy
to restrict burial to Roman Catholics and their family members.”396 The court
was loathe to pass judgment on matters of religious interpretation and
accordingly deferred to the church’s decision on the Coptic issue.397
“The trial court considered that the plain language of the Cemetery Act
excludes religious organizations from the definition of cemetery company
and, [thus], from the prohibition against such entities selling memorials and
private mausoleums.”398 The appellate court agreed that the “plain language
of the Cemetery Act exclude[d the Archdiocese] from the definition of
cemetery company and the attendant prohibition on the sale of monuments
and private mausoleums.”399 This case is instructive, as it shows that courts
will generally refrain from making religious decisions. In this regard,
regulators should likely follow suit when it is not unreasonable to defer to the
religious entities.
According to the facts in the matter of Strader v. Marshall,400 Milton
Marshall acquired Greenhills Memorial Gardens of Christian County, Inc. in
Kentucky in December 1978. Marshall operated the company until he sold it
to Jason and Taunya Strader in 2012.401 Marshall also owned a cemetery in
Clarksville, Tennessee called Resthaven Memorial Gardens.402 During the
391.
392.
393.
394.
395.
396.
397.
398.
399.
400.
401.
402.

Monument Builders of New Jersey, Inc., 2015 WL 3843706, at *3.
Id.
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 45:27–2 (2018).
Monument Builders of New Jersey, Inc., 2015 WL 3843706, at *3.
Id.
Id. at *4.
Id. at *3.
Id. at *2.
Monument Builders of New Jersey, Inc., 2015 WL 3843706, at *2.
No. 5:14-CV-00013-GNS, 2015 WL 1638470, at *1 (W.D. Ky. 2015).
Strader v. Marshall, No. 5:14-CV-00013-GNS, 2015 WL 1638470, at *1 (W.D. Ky. 2015).
Id.
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acquisition process, an accounting firm assured the Straders that Greenhills’
trust funds were in full compliance with Kentucky law.403 However, it is
apparent that this was not the case.404
At some point after the acquisition of the company, the Straders brought
suit against Marshall, alleging that Marshall carried out a number of schemes
during his ownership of Greenhills, an enterprise composed of Marshall and
his wife.405 The Straders alleged the following claims of substantial
wrongdoing on the part of the cemetery with regard to trust funds: (1)
diverting consumer trust funds to personal accounts of the owner; (2) selling
lawn crypts, but never installing them; (3) selling mausoleum spaces in
mausoleums that did not exist; and (4) using the names of living individuals
whose money was in a trust to wrongfully withdraw money from the trustee
bank, which was supposed to release the funds after the purchaser of a crypt
died and his or her remains were laid to rest as contracted.406 The Straders
asserted that all of the foregoing schemes by the Marshalls created trust fund
shortfalls of $2,974,449 dollars.407
The primary question in this case was whether the federal court had
jurisdiction due to the allegation that the activity amounted to a RICO
violation.408 RICO provides both criminal penalties and civil remedies for
racketeering activity.409 Accordingly, the court found that, “a claim for civil
remedies pursuant to RICO provides a jurisdictional basis for [a federal court]
to hear such a [case].”410 In addition, the court could also “elect to exercise
supplemental jurisdiction over [the Straders’] state law claims pursuant to 28
U.S.C. [section] 1367(a), assuming that the state-law claims ‘form[ed] part
of the same case or controversy.’”411 “‘To state a RICO claim, a plaintiff
must plead the following elements: (1) conduct (2) of an enterprise (3)
through a pattern (4) of racketeering activity.’”412 “For the purposes of RICO,
‘enterprise’ is defined as ‘any individual, partnership, corporation,
association, or other legal entity, and any union or group of individuals
associated in fact although not a legal entity . . . .’”413
403. Id.
404. Id.
405. Id.
406. Strader, 2015 WL 1638470, at *1.
407. Id.
408. Id. at *2.
409. Id. (citing 18 U.S.C. §§ 1962–64).
410. Id. (citing Williams v. Duke Energy Int’l, Inc., 681 F.3d 788, 799–803 (6th Cir. 2012);
Riverview Health Inst. LLC v. Med. Mut. of Ohio, 601 F.3d 505, 511 (6th Cir. 2010); Brown v. Cassens
Transp. Co., 546 F.3d 347, 363 (6th Cir. 2008)).
411. Strader, 2015 WL 1638470, at *2 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a)).
412. Id. (quoting Ouwinga v. Benistar 419 Plan Servs., Inc., 694 F.3d 783, 791 (6th Cir. 2012)
(internal quotation marks omitted) (citation omitted)).
413. Id. (citing 18 U.S.C. § 1961(4)).
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As to whether this case qualified as racketeering under RICO, the court
first looked to whether there was an “enterprise.”414 In this regard, the court
noted the mere statement that Marshall’s wife was a member of the enterprise
without presenting any evidence of supporting this allegation was conclusory
and did not support RICO jurisdiction.415 Second, simply alleging that
Marshall acquired Resthaven wrongfully from proceeds of racketeering was
insufficient.416 Taken together, the court found the factual allegations
insufficient to make a valid RICO claim against the Marshalls as the evidence
did not make for a plausible argument that they functioned together toward a
common purpose as members of the alleged enterprise.417
Additionally, in order to allege a valid RICO claim, a plaintiff must show
not only that the predicate act is a “but for” cause of plaintiff’s injuries, but
also that it is a proximate cause.418 While the Straders
provided information about the customers allegedly harmed in the
scheme. . .they [did] not specif[y] the statements which they
contended [we]re fraudulent. The statement that a letter confirming
the false contract was sent to each alleged victim is not sufficient, nor
is an allegation that [Marshall] used the U.S. mail to make claims
against the trustee bank. Additionally, no date or even a date range
has been given for any of these letters.419
The court found that, “[n]either a RICO claim nor mail fraud [were] properly
pled as a predicate act, leaving no independent basis for federal
jurisdiction.”420 Because “‘[a] federal court should typically decline to
exercise pendent jurisdiction over a plaintiff’s state-law claims after
dismissing the plaintiff’s federal claims,’” the court declined to exercise its
jurisdiction over the Straders’ remaining state law claims after finding that
the federal claims failed.421
This case is interesting in that it highlights the difficulties of making a
prima facie RICO case in cemetery contexts. Although some commentators
have urged regulators to look to RICO as an alternative mechanism to check

414.
415.
416.
417.
418.
2012)).
419.
420.
421.

Id.
Id. at *3.
Strader, 2015 WL 1638470, at *3.
Id.
Id. (quoting Heinrich v. Waiting Angels Adoption Servs., Inc., 668 F.3d 393, 404 (6th Cir.
Id. at *4.
Id.
Strader, 2015 WL 1638470, at *4.
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wrongdoing in the cemetery industry,422 this case shows that such efforts are
easier said than done.423
In the recent California case of Safina v. Sorensen,424 at issue was who
has the right to control memorialization merchandise for a deceased person.
At the time of Michael Safina’s death on April 4, 2012, he had three living
siblings (William, Abraham, and Bertha) and was in a forty-eight-year
relationship with Geraldine Freeman.425 “[Before] his death, Michael
amended his trust to disinherit [his brothers] and to name Freeman as the sole
beneficiary.”426 Michael’s brothers filed an action to contest the decision and
invalidate the amendment, which was still pending at the time of this case.427
At the time of Michael’s death, “Sorenson [was] the temporary trustee of
Michael’s trust and the special executor of his estate.”428 After they interred
Michael at Santa Barbara Cemetery, William and Abraham planned to place
a headstone on his grave.429 The two proposed the headstone read “Our
Beloved Brother” on the inscription, but Freeman requested “Our Beloved
Mike.”430 Almost two years after Michael’s death, Sorenson, with Freeman’s
approval, sent an e-mail to William’s attorney requesting, “that they erect a
headstone simply bearing Michael’s name and the dates of birth and
death.”431 The following day, William made the decision to place a headstone
on Michael’s grave that included Michael’s name, dates of birth and death,
the words “BELOVED BROTHER,” and a Masonic symbol.432 The
headstone’s placement and inscriptions deeply offended Freeman, arguing
that it insulted her relationship with Michael, it conflicted with the brothers’
actual relationship, and that it “infringe[d] on her rights as holder of his health
care power of attorney.”433 Again, Sorenson proposed to inscribe something
“neutral” on the headstone and even offered to cover the cost with the trust,
but William refused.434 Sorenson and Freeman then sought court authority to
modify the headstone by deleting the inscription and Masonic symbol.435 The
probate court ordered that, “‘[t]he headstone . . . be changed to that proposed
422. Poul H. Lemasters, Address at the North American Death Care Regulators Association Annual
Conference, (2009).
423. Strader, 2015 WL 1638470, at *3.
424. 2d Civil No. B259237, 2015 WL 7736702, at *2 (Cal. Ct. App. 2015).
425. Safina v. Sorensen, 2d Civil No. B259237, 2015 WL 7736702, *1 (Cal. Ct. App. 2015).
426. Id. (One of the brothers (Abraham) died in the early stages of this dispute, leaving only William
to prosecute this matter).
427. Id.
428. Id.
429. Id.
430. Safina, 2015 WL 7736702, at *1.
431. Id.
432. Id.
433. Id.
434. Id.
435. Safina, 2015 WL 7736702, at *1.
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by Mr. Sorenson” with Michael’s trust paying the cost.436 William moved to
vacate the court’s order, but the court refused to change its ruling, noting that
it provided an equitable result.437
On appeal, the issue was whether a surviving sibling’s right to control
disposition of remains may be enforced so as to give him the power to dictate
the headstone’s inscription, even when he is not the sole surviving sibling and
when he did not properly notify or receive approval from the remaining
surviving sibling.438 Under California law, the right to control disposition of
remains also authorizes the control of funeral goods and services.439 Section
7100 of California’s Health and Safety Code establishes “a hierarchy . . . of
nine categories of persons authorized to control the disposition of the
remains” in order to ensure that those who dispose of remains make a proper
disposition.440 The categories are: (1) holder of a power of attorney for
healthcare; (2) competent surviving spouse; (3) sole surviving competent
adult child of the decedent or, if there is more than one competent adult child
of the decedent, the majority of the surviving competent adult children; (4)
surviving competent parent or parents of the decedent; (5) the sole surviving
competent adult sibling of the decedent or, if there is more than one surviving
competent adult sibling of the decedent, the majority of the surviving
competent adult siblings; (6) surviving competent adult person or persons
respectively in the next degrees of kinship; (7) conservator of the person
appointed under Part 3; (8) conservator of the estate appointed under Part 3;
and (9) public administrator when the deceased has sufficient assets.441
As it pertains to this case, only the first and fifth categories above are
relevant.442 The first category, however, is inapplicable due to the fact that
“Freeman’s power of attorney for Michael’s health care was not notarized or
witnessed in accordance with the Probate Code.”443 The fifth category, which
would apply to William, includes a provision that explains:
‘less than the majority of the surviving competent adult siblings shall
be vested with the rights and duties of this section if they have used
reasonable efforts to notify all other surviving competent adult
siblings of their instructions and are not aware of any opposition to

436. Id. at *2.
437. Id.
438. Id.
439. Id. (citing CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 7100(a) (Deering 2012)).
440. Safina, 2015 WL 7736702, at *2 (citing § 7100; Benbough Mortuary v. Barney, 196 Cal. App.
2d Supp. 861, 865 (1961)).
441. Id.
442. Id. (citing § 7100(a)).
443. Id. (citing CAL. PROB. CODE § 4673(a)(3) (Deering 2018)).
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those instructions by the majority of all surviving competent adult
siblings.’444
Thus, although William argued that he had the sole power to control the
disposition of his brother’s remains and to make merchandise decisions, the
court disagreed, primarily because his sister, Bertha, was still alive.445 The
appellant put on no evidence suggesting that William ever used reasonable
efforts to contact Bertha with his memorialization plans or that he ever
received her agreement as to the inscription, as required by section 7100.446
In fact, Bertha submitted a declaration that she received a copy of the trustee’s
motion regarding the headstone and the placement of neutral language on her
brother’s headstone, which she understood the court granted, and which she
fully supported.447 The court used this statement to support its finding that
the majority of the surviving siblings never agreed to grant William power to
control the disposition of his brother’s remains under section 7100 or
merchandise decision-making authority.448 Accordingly, the court found that
William did not prove that the “adoption of [Sorenson’s] compromise was
arbitrary or unreasonable under the circumstances,” and it affirmed the trial
court’s judgment in holding that the content Sorenson submitted was
“neutral,” did not favor either party, and both Freeman and Michael’s sibling,
Bertha, endorsed it.449
This case is somewhat unique because of the facts (i.e., Freeman’s lack
of a valid power of attorney and William’s failure to obtain unanimity among
the siblings).450 However, it is also illustrative of the bad blood among
families that often becomes exacerbated by a death, and the reality that a
neutral arbiter (here the trustee and the court) is often required to bring
reasonableness to such matters. It is unlikely for a regulator and a neutral
arbiter to be in opposition, but this case suggests that attorneys representing
clients in such disputes should perhaps consider arbitration as a means to
ratchet down animosity and to bring about a resolution in such matters.
The case of Listecki v. Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors,451
importantly considers the classification of cemetery trust funds in bankruptcy
scenarios. Specifically at issue in this case was the classification of cemetery
444. Id. (citing § 7100(a)(5)).
445. Safina, 2015 WL 7736702, at *2
446. Id.
447. Id. at *3.
448. Id.
449. Id.
450. Id. at *1, 2-3 (“[N]othing in the record relating to the petition suggests William obtained
Bertha’s agreement to the inspection or that he ‘used reasonable efforts to notify’ her of his intention, as
required by section 7100, subdivision (a)(5).”).
451. 780 F.3d 731, 734 (7th Cir. 2015).
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trust funds of the Archdiocese of Milwaukee, and whether those funds are
considered assets of the Archdiocese’s estate in a bankruptcy matter filed due
to the impacts of sex abuse scandals.452 In 2007, after two sex abuse suits
against them, the Archdiocese transferred fifty-five million dollars from its
general accounts to its cemetery trust accounts.453 The Archdiocese filed for
bankruptcy protection in 2011.454 The bankruptcy creditors argued that the
Archdiocese fraudulently transferred this amount to shield monies from them
and that it should be reversed.455 The Archdiocese countered with the
argument that it had a religious obligation to provide for the perpetual care of
its cemeteries and that forcing it to invade its perpetual care trust would
violate its religious freedom under the First Amendment and the Religious
Freedom Restoration Act (“RFRA”).456 The court easily did away with the
RFRA defense.457 The court noted that RFRA only applies if the government
is involved in a dispute with a religious entity.458 Finding that the bankruptcy
creditor’s committee is not “the government” as contemplated by RFRA, the
court found the Archdiocese could not use RFRA as a shield to protect its
actions of transferring funds in this matter.459
The court then turned to the issue of First Amendment rights.460 The issue
under the First Amendment was whether an order commanding the
Archdiocese to make funds available to creditors was a violation of the free
exercise of religion clause of the Constitution.461 The court acknowledged
the reality that a firmly held religious conviction that cemeteries must be
protected is a factor that triggers the protections of the First Amendment.462
Even though this was a suit between two private parties (the Archdiocese and
a creditor’s committee in a bankruptcy adversary proceeding), the court
recognized the applicability of the First Amendment.463 However, the court
noted that the First Amendment protections are not absolute.464 The court
here noted that if there is a compelling governmental interest in violating the
free exercise provision, the provision can be violated.465 Further, the court
452. Listecki v. Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors, 780 F.3d 731, 734 (7th Cir. 2015).
453. Id.
454. Id.
455. Id.
456. Id. at 735.
457. Listecki, 780 F.3d at 736 (noting that the court “previously said in dicta that ‘RFRA is
applicable only to suits in which the government is a party.’”).
458. Id. at 736.
459. Id. at 737-38.
460. Id. at 742.
461. Id.
462. Listecki, 780 F.3d at 742.
463. Id. at 741-42.
464. Id. at 742-43 (quoting Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2761 (2014); City
of Berne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997); Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 879-80 (1990)).
465. Id. (citing Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 531-32 (1993)).
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noted that if the law (in this case, bankruptcy law) is of neutral application,
its application to a religious situation does not offend the First Amendment.466
The Seventh Circuit then embarked on a review to determine exactly
what religious matter was the subject of this case. In this regard, the court
found that it could not make determinations about whether the protection of
cemeteries is a reasonably held religious belief,467 finding such a
determination is outside of a secular court’s authority.468 However, this did
not end the court’s inquiry. The Seventh Circuit did find that it has the
authority to make determinations regarding whether the funds transfer was
fraudulent when it stated, “the court need not interpret any religious law or
principles to make that determination.”469 Following this latter conclusion,
the Seventh Circuit determined that the question of fraud is fair game for
secular courts and is not something protected by the First Amendment.470
This analysis did not end the inquiry into the court’s authority in this
matter. The next question was whether the Bankruptcy Code represented a
neutral application of the law.471 Finding that the Code itself is neutral, the
court observed that, “[t]he purpose of the Bankruptcy Code’s avoidance and
turnover provisions ‘is to maximize the bankruptcy estate and thereby
maximize the recovery for creditors.’”472 The court further observed that,
“[t]he Challenged Provisions and the Code as a whole are generally applied
to all entities with equal force—be it a church, synagogue, deli, bank, city or
any other qualifying debtor.”473 Accordingly, the Bankruptcy Code does not
prohibit the practice of religion nor does it “single out only religious
practice.”474 Thus, the Seventh Circuit found that the Bankruptcy Code is
neutral, voiding a First Amendment defense by the Archdiocese in this
case.475 Further, the court here found that the protection of creditors’ rights
is such a compelling government interest that, even if the application of the
Code to this matter was not neutral, it would not allow a violation of the First
Amendment.476
466. Id. at 742-43 (citing Burwell, 134 S. Ct. at 2761; City of Berne, 521 U.S. at 507; Emp’t Div.,
494 U.S. at 879-80; Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, 508 U.S. at 531-32).
467. Listecki, 780 F.3d at 742 (citing Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC,
132 S. Ct. 694, 706 (2012); McCarthy v. Fuller, 714 F.3d 971, 975 (7th Cir. 2013); Korte v. Sebelius, 735
F.3d 654, 683 (7th Cir. 2013)).
468. Id.
469. Id.
470. Id.
471. Id.
472. Listecki, 780 F.3d at 743 (quoting Tort Claimants Comm. v. Roman Catholic Archbishop (In
re Roman Catholic Archbishop), 335 B.R. 842, 864 (Bankr. D. Or. 2005)).
473. Id.
474. Id. at 744.
475. Id. at 743.
476. Id. at 745-46.
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A major shortcoming of this case is that it does not consider the
implications of the decision on the consumers who purchased interment rights
covered by the trust funds at issue. As is the case in most perpetual care
cemeteries, the consumers were likely sold cemetery spaces with a
representation of perpetual care—a highly regulated area of the law in most
states.477 This highly regulated nature of cemetery trust funds suggests that
other governmental interests are implicated in cemetery situations in
bankruptcy besides creditor protection. It is disappointing that no regulatory
entity was a party to this matter arguing for the preservation of the trust funds
inasmuch as once these monies are transferred to the trust funds, they are no
longer available to the debtor for any purpose other than cemetery
maintenance.478 In other words, while the logic of this decision, in a vacuum,
is sound, the potential ramifications of failing to consider the policy behind
the sacred nature of cemetery trust funds is troubling.
The Tennessee case of Wofford v. M.J. Edwards & Sons Funeral Home,
Inc.,479 provides an interesting glimpse into how courts occasionally fudge
the basic rules of law in cases where someone is coping with the death of a
loved one. In this case, the plaintiff appeared dissatisfied with the funeral
home’s handling of her father’s remains.480 Following the filing of suit, the
funeral home invoked the arbitration clause of the funeral contract, arguing
that the plaintiff agreed not to sue in the event of a dispute over the contract.481
Although the arbitration clause was in all capital letters in the contract,482 the
plaintiff claimed that she only read the portion of the agreement that
contained the prices to make sure that they were correct.483
The court here noted that arbitration is favored under Tennessee law,484
and that because the arbitration clause is clear and unambiguous, under
normal circumstances it would be enforceable.485 However, the court also
observed that parties cannot be forced to arbitrate something that they never

477. 14 C.J.S. Cemeteries § 25 (2018).
478. Listecki, 780 F.3d at 734-35 (The Archdiocese created a trust fund to maintain the cemeteries
and he submitted an affidavit as such explaining that he had a duty “to ‘properly maintain [] in perpetuity’
the cemeteries and mausoleums, and ‘[i]f the Committee is successful in converting the [Funds] into
property of the Debtor’s estate, there will be no funds . . . for the perpetual care of the Milwaukee Catholic
Cemeteries.”).
479. 490 S.W.3d 800, 806 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2015).
480. Id. at 804-05.
481. Id. at 805.
482. Id. at 803-04. During discovery, it came to light that only a reference to the arbitration clause
was contained in the contract provided to the consumer when she signed the document. The actual clause
was not contained therein. Id.
483. Wofford, 490 S.W.3d at 804.
484. Id. at 808.
485. Id. at 808-09 (citing D & E Constr. Co. v. Robert J. Denley Co., 38 S.W.3d 513, 518 (Tenn.
2001)).
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agreed to arbitrate.486 In this case, the court put great emphasis on the
differing positions of the parties—a sophisticated funeral home versus a
consumer who had never contracted with a funeral home before.487 Further,
by the time the plaintiff became aware of the actual arbitration language, the
funeral home already begun work to prepare her father’s body for the funeral
and, thus, the process was likely already past the point of no return.488
Certainly, as the court observed, other funeral homes in the area did not have
arbitration requirements in their contracts.489 However, as the court notes, by
the time the plaintiff knew of the arbitration clause, the plaintiff “had ‘no
realistic choice but to acquiesce’ in signing the Contract.”490 For this reason,
the court held that the contract at issue here was a contract of adhesion, which
lends to a finding of unenforceability.491 In order to fully find the arbitration
clause unenforceable, the court must also determine whether the arbitration
clause in the contract is unconscionable.492 The court here found that the
clause is unconscionable because the funeral home did not give the consumer
an opportunity to question the terms of the contract or to negotiate for
anything.493
It is doubtful that such a finding could be obtained outside of a situation
in which a consumer is dealing with the death of a loved one. However, this
case is a strong indication that anti-consumer contract provisions are at risk
of being stricken in funeral and cemetery contracts.
The matter of Midwest Memorial Group LLC v. Citigroup Global
Markets494 is an offshoot lawsuit from a massive swindle in the cemetery
industry much documented by the press.495 This case does not consider the
actual original problem covered in the press. Instead, the fallout from the
original matter and its implications for an accounting firm is the subject of
this case.496 The question before this Michigan court was whether an
accounting firm that conducted an audit of cemetery trust funds prior to the
embezzlement of sixty million dollars in trust funds should be held liable for

486. Id. at 809 (quoting Frizzell Constr. Co. v. Gatinburg, L.L.C., 9 S.W.3d 79, 84 (Tenn. 1999)).
487. Id. at 811-12.
488. Wofford, 490 S.W.3d at 816.
489. Id. at 815.
490. Id. at 816 (quoting Wallace v. Nat’l Bank of Commerce, 938 S.W.2d 684, 687 (Tenn. 1996)).
491. Id. at 816-17.
492. Id. at 817 (quoting Buraczynski v. Eyring, 919 S.W.2d 314, 320 (Tenn. 1996)).
493. Wofford, 490 S.W.3d at 824.
494. No. 322338, 2015 WL 5519398, at *3-4 (Mich. Ct. App. 2015).
495. Midwest Mem’l Grp. LLC v. Citigroup Glob. Mkts., No. 322338, 2015 WL 5519398, at *1
(Mich. Ct. App. 2015); see also Roger Parloff, Stealing from the Dead, FORTUNE (Aug. 13, 2007, 9:59
AM), http://archive.fortune.com/2007/08/10/news/funeral_home.fortune/index.htm (recounting the theft
of trust funds from cemetery trust funds in Michigan and Tennessee).
496. Midwest Mem’l Grp. LLC, 2015 WL 5519398, at *3-4.
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the replacement of the missing funds.497 One of the subsidiaries of the
embezzling company hired Plante Moran, an independent counting firm, to
perform an audit.498 Plante Moran did not catch any of the embezzlement
activity in its audit and was later sued for malpractice in having missed what,
in hindsight, should have been an obvious crime.499 The district court found
that Plante Moran should not be held liable for missing the embezzlement in
its audit.500 The subsidiary specifically tailored Plante Moran’s contract to
provide an audit of the subsidiary’s compliance with cemetery operation laws
in 2004, and the embezzlement occurred elsewhere in the corporate
structure.501
The subsidiary also retained Plante Moran after the
embezzlement occurred.502 The contract never specifically tasked Plante
Moran with attempting to identify fraud nor to look at the looted firms.503
Despite Plante Moran’s victories (and, frankly, the logic of them) at the
district court, the appellate court refused to let the auditing firm completely
off the liability hook in a summary proceeding.504 The appellate court, though
substantially agreeing that the scope of the audit, did not look at trust fund
discrepancies and found unanswered questions regarding whether the trust
funds of the looted companies were something audited by Plante Moran—
questions that could not be answered in a summary proceeding.505 Thus,
though standing in good stead heading into evidentiary portions of this
dispute, Plante Moran remained a party to the dispute to ensure that it did not
share in liability following a review of the relevant evidence.506 This case is
not overly instructive of anything related to cemeteries or the dead. Instead,
it stands for the proposition that in fraud scenarios, it is unlikely that parties
with potential knowledge of fraudulent activity can extricate themselves
easily.
In the matter of In re Estate of Love,507 the question before the court was
who gets to control the substance of an engraving on a grave marker. In this
case, the deceased’s husband and adult children ordered a grave marker with
their wife’s/mother’s biological last name engraved on the stone.508 The
deceased’s adoptive father objected to this use of the biological last name and
497. Id. at *1.
498. Id. at *3-4.
499. Id. at *4.
500. Id. at *7.
501. Midwest Mem’l Grp. LLC, 2015 WL 5519398, at *15-16.
502. Id. at *47.
503. Id. at *16-17.
504. Id. at *49.
505. Id. at *49-50.
506. Midwest Mem’l Grp. LLC, 2015 WL 5519398, at *49-50.
507. No. W2014-02507-COA-R3-CV, 2015 WL 5511318, at *3-4 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2015).
508. In re Estate of Love, No. W2014-02507-COA-R3-CV, 2015 WL 5511318, at *1 (Tenn. Ct.
App. 2015).
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brought an action to have the marker replaced.509 According to the appellate
court, under Tennessee law, control of the engraving on a grave marker
follows the scheme of individuals who hold the right to control the disposition
of the deceased’s remains.510 The reasoning for this holding is the specific
phrasing of the relevant Tennessee law, which gives the party authorized to
make disposition decisions the authority to both dispose of the remains and
to make “arrangements for funeral goods and services . . . .”511 One line of
attack raised by the adoptive father was that the court should use the law
regulating cemeteries in Tennessee rather than that regulating the disposal of
the dead, which would somehow change the outcome from that under the
disposition of remains statute.512 The court rejected this argument, noting that
this case does not deal with the regulation of cemeteries, but rather with the
right of disposition and memorialization, a right clearly falling under the
disposition statute.513 Under this reasoning, both the surviving husband and
the surviving children outrank the surviving adoptive father, meaning that the
latter does not have standing to contest the contents of a grave marker.514 The
court concluded that this reasoning was sound because to rule “otherwise
would potentially mean that an individual cannot control what is written on
his or her own headstone.”515
The adoptive father’s other line of attack in this case was that the use of
the decedent’s biological name, rather than her adopted name, was an “illegal
change of the decedent’s name after her death.”516 The appellate court
quickly rejected this argument, as a grave marker does not represent any sort
of recognized official, legal document on which it would be unlawful to make
a postmortem name change.517
The result in this case is not surprising, but the case, in itself, is indicative
of the tense familial relationships that can surface upon someone’s death. The
lesson to be gleaned from this case is that it is not financially sound to
challenge a grave marker inscription in the absence of actual libel or in the
absence of being an individual with the right to control disposition.

509.
510.
511.
512.
513.
514.
515.
516.
517.

Id.
Id. at *4-5 (citing TENN. CODE ANN. § 62-5-703 (2018)).
Id. at *5.
Id. at *7-8 (citing TENN. CODE ANN. § 46-1-102 (2018)).
In re Estate of Love, 2015 WL 5511318, at *8.
Id. at *13.
Id. at *11 (citing TENN. CODE ANN. § 62-5-703 (2018)).
Id. at *12.
Id. at *12-13.
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E. Human Remains Issues
The Florida case of Wilson v. Wilson,518 is a dispute over the disposition
of someone’s remains. In this case, the plaintiff and defendant had a twentythree-year-old son who died in an automobile accident.519 The son was
single, had no children, and left no will nor verbal instructions as to the
disposition of his body.520 Both the plaintiff and defendant were considered
“co-personal representatives of their son’s estate, [as well as] the sole
beneficiaries.”521 Following his death, the plaintiff and defendant agreed to
have their son cremated, but could not come to an agreement regarding the
final disposition of his ashes.522 The defendant wanted the ashes buried in
West Palm Beach, Florida, whereas the plaintiff wanted the ashes placed in a
family burial plot in Blue Ridge, Georgia.523 In his petition, the father argued
that the ashes should be declared “property” subject to partition under the
probate code of Florida, which would allow both he and his son’s mother to
dispose of their half of the ashes as they wished.524 The mother staunchly
opposed this partition of her son’s ashes for religious reasons.525
Following a hearing on the matter, the trial court denied the father’s
petition by determining that the ashes could not be considered “property”
subject to partition.526 Furthermore, the trial court directed the parents to,
within thirty days, come to an agreement regarding the disposition of their
son’s remains.527 If the two did not come to an agreement, the trial court
stated that it would appoint a curator to carry out the disposition.528 On
appeal, the mother argued that the ashes are not considered “property” subject
to ownership, but rather the law only gives “a limited possessory right to the
[next of kin] for disposition purposes.”529 The father disagreed.530
Florida’s “probate code defines ‘property’ as ‘both real and personal
property or any interest in it and anything that may be the subject of
ownership.’”531 Consistent with common law and civil law principles, the

518. 138 So. 3d 1176, 1177 (Fla. Ct. App. 2014).
519. Id.
520. Id.
521. Id.
522. Id.
523. Wilson, 138 So. 3d at 1177.
524. Id.
525. Id.
526. Id.
527. Id.
528. Wilson, 138 So. 3d at 1177.
529. Id.
530. Id. (arguing that “the ashes fit within the plain meaning of ‘property’ as defined by section
731.201(32)”).
531. Id. at 1178 (quoting FLA. STAT. § 731.201(32) (2012)).
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Florida Supreme Court in State v. Powell,532 held that “the next of kin have
no property right in the remains of a decedent.”533 The “right to the remains
is limited to ‘possession of the body for the purpose of burial, sepulture, or
other lawful disposition.’”534 Essentially, “there is a legitimate claim of
entitlement by the next of kin to possession of the remains of a decedent for
burial or other lawful disposition.”535 However, the “claim of entitlement is
not a property right, nor does such a claim make the remains ‘property.’”536
Because, historically, cremated remains are treated in the same manner
as a body, neither of which constitute “property,” the appellate court correctly
held that the decedent’s remains is not considered “property.”537 Thus,
because the cremated remains are not “property,” they are not subject to
partition between two parties.538 Accordingly, the appellate court affirmed
the trial court’s judgment, which essentially agreed with the mother’s
argument that while a right to control or possess remains for disposition
purposes belongs to the next of kin, the remains are not to be considered
“property.”539 The outcome of this case is correct and consistent with longstanding legal notions regarding the nature of human remains.540
At issue in the recent Florida case of SCI Funeral Services of Florida v.
Borja541 was the question of who controls disposition of human remains in
the absence of a testament.542 According to the facts, following Franklin
Burr’s death on March 12, 2014, Burr’s daughter, Janet Masching, sent his
body to Moss-Feaster Funeral Home and Cremation Services.543 Burr’s will
designated William Borja as the personal representative of his estate, but was
“silent as to [Burr’s] preferred method of disposition.”544 Shortly after their
father’s death, Janet Masching and Franklin Burr II began to dispute the
method for disposition of their father’s remains.545 Accordingly, MossFeaster filed a petition for declaratory judgment asking the court to determine
“which party had the authority to authorize disposition of Burr’s remains,” as

532. State v. Powell, 497 So. 2d 1188, 1191 (Fla. 1986).
533. Wilson, 138 So. 3d at 1178 (quoting Powell, 497 So. 2d at 1191).
534. Id. (quoting Powell, 497 So. 2d at 1191-92).
535. Id. (quoting Crocker v. Pleasant, 778 So. 2d 978, 988 (Fla. 2001)).
536. Id.
537. Id. (citing Cohen v. Guardianship of Cohen, 896 So. 2d 950, 954 (Fla. Ct. App. 2005)).
538. Wilson, 138 So. 3d at 1179.
539. Id.
540. Seidemann, supra note 190, at 903.
541. No. 14-004275-CI, 2015 Fla. Cir. LEXIS 27633 (Fla. Cir. Ct. 2015).
542. SCI Funeral Servs. Of Fla. v. Borja, No. 14-004275-CI, 2015 Fla. Cir. LEXIS 27633, at *3
(Fla. Cir. Ct. 2015).
543. Id. at *1-2.
544. Id. at *2.
545. Id.
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well as the “ultimate method of disposition for the decedent’s remains . . .
.”546
In determining which party has the authority to act as the responsible
party in the disposition of human remains, the Florida law set out a priority
of persons classified as the “legally authorized person.”547 As it applies to
this case, priority does to the “‘written inter vivos authorizations and
directions’ of the decedent himself and then a lower priority of the decedent’s
son or daughter who is eighteen years of age or older.”548 Above all, the
intent of the decedent is paramount, regardless whether that intent is written
or made orally.549 In this matter, the court found the evidence presented
reliable that decedent created written inter vivos directives for disposition by
cremation.550 Under Florida law, these directives take priority over all other
legally authorized persons’ wishes.551 Because the decedent prepared written
inter vivos directions (though not contained in his testament), he thus directed
the posthumous disposition of his own body.552
In this case, the evidence of the decedent’s wishes derived from a contract
between Burr and Calvary Catholic Cemetery and Chapel Mausoleum “for
the purchase of two side-by-side cremation niches” (one for Burr’s late wife
and one for Burr).553 The contract further outlined “the engraving of his late
wife’s name on one niche . . . and [Burr’s] own name on the adjacent
niche.”554 Additionally, Burr wrote emergency instructions that indicated his
intent to be cremated and placed in the prepaid mausoleum niche at Calvary
Catholic Cemetery and Chapel Mausoleum.555 The appellate court here
determined that such “evidence is sufficient to constitute inter vivos written
directives of the decedent under [Florida law]”.556 Lastly, because Burr did
not leave a writing with detailed instructions to effectuate his disposition, the
court designated a party to carry out his wishes.557 Citing the irreconcilable
dispute between Burr’s children, the court determined that Borja was the
appropriate party to carry out Burr’s wishes.558
546. Id. at *1.
547. SCI Funeral Servs. of Fla., 2015 Fla. Cir. LEXIS 27633, at *2-3 (citing FLA. STAT. §
497.005(39) (2018)).
548. Id. at *3.
549. Arthur v. Milstein, 949 So. 2d 1163, 1166 (Fla. Ct. App. 2007); Cohen v. Cohen, 896 So. 2d
950, 955 (Fla. Ct. App. 2005).
550. SCI Funeral Servs. of Fla., 2015 Fla. Cir. LEXIS 27633, at *4-5.
551. Id. *3-4 (citing Arthur, 949 So. 2d at 66; Cohen, 896 So. 2d at 955).
552. Id.
553. Id. at *4.
554. Id.
555. SCI Funeral Servs. of Fla., 2015 Fla. Cir. LEXIS 27633, at *4-5.
556. Id. at *5.
557. Id. at *6.
558. Id. at *6-7.
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The matter of Rinnier v. Gracelawn Mem’l Park Inc.559 was a review of
the general disfavor of the disinterment of human remains. According to the
facts of this case, on June 19, 2008, Laura Bowdoin was found dead in her
home and was survived by her mother, Mary Rinnier, her husband, George,
and her twelve-year-old daughter.560 Laura’s manner of death was
“undetermined” (i.e., “the medical examiner could not conclude . . . whether
the death was accidental or intentional.”).561 Following the autopsy, Laura’s
body was subsequently embalmed and interred at Gracelawn Memorial Park
Cemetery on June 27, 2008.562 Ms. Rinnier, Laura’s mother, believed that
the death was a homicide and in 2011 brought an action to exhume Laura’s
body in order to conduct another autopsy to determine the manner of death.563
After four years, the case went to trial, where “both sides presented expert
testimony regarding” whether a second autopsy of Laura’s body “was likely
to produce any new information about the cause or manner of her death.”564
The issue in this case was whether human remains may be exhumed in
order to have a second autopsy done to make a more final decision as to the
cause and manner of death.565 Under Delaware law, with regard to the
exhumation of human remains, two conditions must be met in order to justify
an autopsy after burial.566 Those two conditions are as follows:
It must appear that, through no fault of the [claimant] it was
impracticable to demand and perform the autopsy before interment,
and secondly, it must be reasonably certain that an examination of
the body will reveal something bearing on the rights of the parties
which could not otherwise be discovered.567
The court in this case noted that, through a seemingly harmless act, the
standard to exhume remains “is high because the search for ‘the truth’ cannot
overlook issues of religion, the decedent’s wishes, the effect on loved ones,
or the public interest.”568 The court explained that Rinnier met the first
element because there was no way for her to foresee the need for the second
autopsy before Laura was buried.569 Yet, the court held that Rinnier did not
559.
560.
2015).
561.
562.
563.
564.
565.
566.
1940)).
567.
568.
569.

No. 6473-ML, 2015 WL 7568363 (Del. Ch. 2015).
Rinnier v. Gracelawn Mem’l Park Inc., No. 6473-ML, 2015 WL 7568363, at *2 (Del. Ch.
Id. at *3.
Id. at *4.
Id. at *5.
Id. at *7.
Rinnier, 2015 WL 7568363, at 7.
Id. at *23 (citing McCulloch v. Mutual Life Ins. Co. of New York, 109 F.2d 866 (4th Cir.
Id. at *23-24.
Id. at *24 (citing Petition of Sheffield Farms Co., 126 A.2d 886, 891 (N.J. 1956)).
Id. at *24.

Published by DigitalCommons@ONU, 2018

55

Ohio Northern University Law Review, Vol. 45 [2018], Iss. 1, Art. 11

56

OHIO NORTHERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 45

show with reasonable certainty that a second autopsy would reveal
information regarding Laura’s manner or cause of death that had not already
been discovered.570 Altogether, the court determined that while it felt remorse
for Rinnier’s grief due to the uncertainty of her daughter’s cause of death and
understood her strong desire to have a final conclusion, the court found no
evidence presented that met the high standard required to exhume remains,
nor did the circumstances of the case sway the court to believe that such
disturbance of the deceased’s remains would yield fruitful results.571 By
denying Rinnier’s request, this court joined a long line of cases that hold
sacrosanct the quiet of the grave and generally rebuff efforts to exhume
human remains.
In another disinterment case, Manson v. Manson,572 a New York court
was asked to weigh in on a parent’s wish to relocate his son. According to
the facts, on June 2, 1976, John William Manson died in a car accident at age
three.573 Many years after his interment, the three-year-old’s father brought
an action to disinter his son’s body and relocate him to a different resting
place.574 The father wished to relocate his son’s body so that he and his son
could rest somewhere other than the plots owned by he and the son’s mother,
which, at the time of this case, the father found undesirable for reasons
relating to the divorce between himself and John’s mother.575 The father
purchased three adjoining plots in Riverside Cemetery so that John could be
buried between his mother and father, but the mother could only be buried
alongside John on the condition that she agreed to the relocation.576 Both the
mother and the Roman Catholic Community of Morristown, Hammond, and
Rossie (“the Parish”), who operated the cemetery where John was originally
interred, opposed the father’s request.577 The Parish argued that after so many
years, and due to the uncertainty as to whether his casket was sealed in a
vault, the son’s remains may not still be intact; and furthermore, due to the
fact that the father and mother are owners of five interment rights in that
cemetery, the father may already be able to have what he seeks without a
disinterment.578 The mother further argued that granting relief to the father

570.
571.
572.
573.
Ct. 2015).
574.
575.
576.
577.
578.

Rinnier, 2015 WL 7568363, at *25.
Id. at *25-26.
No. CV-2015-0146170, 2015 N.Y. Mics. LEXIS 4864 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2015).
Manson v. Manson, No. CV-2015-0146170, 2015 N.Y. Mics. LEXIS 4864, at *1 (N.Y. Sup.
Id.
Id.
Id. at *1-2.
Id. at *2.
Manson, 2015 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 4864, at *2.
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would only cause her “incalculable pain in having to bury her child twice,”
to which the son’s surviving siblings agreed.579
The issue was, thus, whether good and substantial reasons exist to support
the disturbance of a long-at-rest decedent’s grave.580 The court noted here
that in certain situations there may be a need to disturb the repose of the
deceased; but even then, there must be a substantial public reason or superior
private right in order to convince a court to allow an act that is traditionally
considered “desecration.”581 Here, neither of the parents possessed a superior
right over the other as to their son’s place of burial.582 Thus, according to the
court, its ability to grant permission to disinter human remains rests on a
discretionary determination of whether such an act would cause great distress
to loved ones’ emotions.583 The court denied the father’s request, reasoning
that the evidence produced—specifically the existence of the plots already
jointly owned by the parents—failed to show good and substantial reasons as
to why his son should be disinterred, and further proved no just cause in this
situation, rather a showing of a family dispute.584 Thus, consistent with the
Delaware court in the Rinnier matter, the New York court again upheld the
sanctity of the grave and became another in a long line of cases where courts
disfavor disinterment.
The recent Wisconsin case of Olejnik v. England585 is something of an
anomaly, but one that is prescient of late in other jurisdictions. In this case,
from 2007 to January 17, 2012, Traci England was an Oneida County Medical
Examiner.586 At some point during her term as medical examiner, England
decided to train her own dog to locate human remains—but not for use in
connection with her job as a medical examiner.587 On May 16, 2011, David
Olejnik died at the age of 38.588 The following day, England ordered an
autopsy, which was then performed in a neighboring county.589 Olejnik’s
parents accepted the autopsy as necessary to discover what exactly caused the
death of their son.590 At some point during the autopsy, England “took a piece
of gauze covered with visceral fat from a biohazard waste container,” which

579. Id. at *2-3.
580. Id. at *4 (citing Briggs v. Hemstreet-Briggs, 256 A.D.2d 894 (N.Y. App. Div. 1998)).
581. Id. at *3 (citing In re Ackermann, 124 A.D. 684, 685 (N.Y. App. Div. 1908)).
582. Id. at *3-4.
583. Manson, 2015 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 4864, at *4 (citing Yome v. Gorman, 152 N.E. 126, 128
(N.Y. 1926)).
584. Id., at *5 (quoting Currier v. Woodlawn Cemetery, 90 N.E.2d 18, 18 (N.Y. 1949)).
585. 147 F. Supp. 3d 763 (W.D. Wis. 2015).
586. Id. at 767.
587. Id.
588. Id. at 768.
589. Id.
590. Olejnik, 147 F. Supp. 3d at 768.
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she was unauthorized to do.591 “In November and December 2011, England
took her dog to two cadaver dog training sessions “and also brought some
human tissue to the session to serve as a training aid.592 England explained
that the material only contained “her daughter’s placenta and [the] visceral
fat from Olejnik,” but Olejnik’s parents contended that it also contained one
of Olejnik’s organs.593 Furthermore, “some participants at the session recall
England describing it as an ‘organ,’” of which the participants divided among
themselves to take home and use to train their dogs.594
On January 3, 2012, an Oneida County sheriff’s deputy learned that
England removed materials from two autopsies conducted that day and
arrested and charged her with misconduct in office and theft the next day.595
As part of the criminal investigation, law enforcement procured the material
that England gave out at the previous cadaver dog training session, and the
state crime lab detected Olejnik’s DNA in the material.596 Subsequently,
England pleaded to the charges based on the materials taken from the
autopsies and was sentenced to three years of probation, community service,
and one year of jail time (imposed but withheld).597 Olejnik’s parents “filed
suit in state court, asserting four federal constitutional claims pursuant to 42
U.S.C. § 1983 and four state law claims.”598 The matter was removed to
federal court,599 and the county’s insurer intervened and sought a declaration
that the parents’ claims were not covered by county policy.600
The critical liability issue here was whether England was a government
official acting under color of state law in removing bodily material from a
deceased individual to use in unauthorized cadaver training, so as to subject
her to liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.601 The parents brought federal
constitutional claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which authorizes suits for
damages against individual government officials who violate civil rights
under the United States Constitution or a federal statute.602 To prevail on
their section 1983 claims, the parents must “demonstrate: (1) that England’s
wrongful conduct was taken ‘under color of law;’ and (2) that England
deprived them of rights protected by federal law.”603 In determining whether
591.
592.
593.
594.
595.
596.
597.
598.
599.
600.
601.
602.
603.

Id. at 769.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Olejnik, 147 F. Supp. 3d at 769.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Olejnik, 147 F. Supp. 3d at 769.
Id. at 770.
Id. at 769.
Id. (citing Windle v. City of Marion, 321 F.3d 658, 661 (7th Cir. 2003)).
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a government official acted “under color of law,” courts most commonly
consider the following two factors: (1) “whether the wrongful acts furthered
an officer’s official duties,” and/]or (2) “whether the official invoked his
authority or deployed indicia of his authority when committing the wrongful
acts.”604 “Under color of law” basically means “under pretense of law,” thus
the acts of officials in the ambit of their personal pursuits are plainly excluded
from section 1983 liability.605
To find that plaintiffs are deprived of their protected rights, courts will
turn to an analysis of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,
which prohibits states from “depriv[ing] any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law[.]”606 To prevail on a procedural due
process claim under section 1983, “plaintiffs must demonstrate that they: (1)
have a cognizable property interest; (2) have suffered a deprivation of that
interest; and (3) were denied due process.”607 First, it must be determined
whether the plaintiffs have a cognizable property interest at stake.608 “Under
Wisconsin law, a family’s interest in the remains of its deceased loved ones
is simply too contingent to constitute a protected property interest.”609
Wisconsin law “provides that the next-of-kin’s right to control final
disposition of a loved one’s remains is subject to the medical examiner’s
powers and duties ‘with respect to the reporting of certain deaths,
performance of autopsies, and inquests . . . .’”610 “A medical examiner is
authorized to ‘take for analysis any and all specimens, body fluids and any
other material which will assist him or her in determining the cause of
death,’” and “a medical examiner may, in her discretion, order an autopsy for
purposes of determining how an individual died if she has reason to believe
that death ‘may have been due to suicide or unexplained or suspicious
circumstances.’”611 The court found that, under Wisconsin law, “a family’s
right to dispose of the remains of its deceased loved ones is not ‘securely and
durably’ theirs and, thus, it does not rise to the level of a constitutionally
protected property interest.”612 Furthermore, the Wisconsin Supreme Court
recognized “that the family’s right to the remains of its decedents is not a

604. Id. at 771 (citing Wilson v. Price, 624 F.3d 389, 392 (7th Cir. 2010); Honaker v. Smith, 256
F.3d 477, 484–85 (7th Cir. 2001)); Latuszkin v. City of Chicago, 250 F.3d 502, 505–06 (7th Cir. 2001)).
605. Olejnik, 147 F. Supp. 3d at 771 (citing Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91, 111 (1945)).
606. Id. at 772 (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1).
607. Id. at 772 (citing Khan v. Bland, 630 F.3d 519, 527 (7th Cir. 2010)).
608. Id. at 772-73.
609. Id. at 773.
610. Olejnik, 147 F. Supp. 3d at 773 (citing WIS. STAT. § 154.30(3)(a)( 2) (2017)).
611. Id. at 773-74 (citing WIS. STAT. § 979.01(3) (2017); WIS. STAT. § 979.02 (2017); WIS. STAT.
§ 979.04 (2017)).
612. Id. at 774.
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property right but is rather a ‘personal right of the family of the deceased to
bury the body.’”613
Second, the court must determine whether the plaintiffs suffered some
deprivation of the aforementioned cognizable property interest.614 The court
explained that even if it assumed that Wisconsin law does create a
“constitutionally protected [ ] entitlement to bury a loved one’s remains free
from mutilation, [the parents here did not] demonstrate that England deprived
[them] of that entitlement when she ordered Olejnik’s autopsy,” as “an
authorized autopsy does not constitute ‘mutilation’ or interference with a
loved one’s remains because it is not an ‘improper act.’”615 Accordingly, the
presupposed “state-created interest does not protect against all interference
with a loved one’s remains . . . .”616 Rather, “it protects only against
unwarranted mutilation and is subordinate to a medical examiner’s authority
to order an autopsy.”617 In the present case, “England did not exceed her
authority” due to the fact that:
‘[a] medical examiner only acts outside [of her authority] when [s]he
orders or conducts an autopsy either without having made a
subjective determination that there is any reason to believe that any
of the statutory circumstances justifying an autopsy exists or having
made a subjective determination that there is no reason to believe that
any of the statutory circumstances justifying an autopsy exists.’618
Here, England stated in her testimony that due to the fact that Olejnik was a
relatively young man and died due to unexplained and possibly suspicious
reasons, she felt it necessary to order an autopsy to make a definitive
determination as to the cause of his death.619 Based on this reality, the court
found no evidence showing that “England acted outside of her authority when
she ordered the autopsy.”620
Lastly, in section 1983 matters, an examination must be made as to
whether plaintiffs were denied any process to which they were due.621 In this
case, the court specifically addressed England’s removal of Olejnik’s bodily
material.622 “‘In procedural due process claims, the deprivation by state
action of a constitutionally protected interest in life, liberty, or property is not,
613.
614.
615.
616.
617.
618.
619.
620.
621.
622.

Id. (quoting Scarpaci v. Milwaukee Cty., 292 N.W.2d 816, 820-21 (Wis. 1980)).
See id. at 774.
Olejnik, 147 F. Supp. 3d at 773 (quoting Scarpaci, 292 N.W.2d at 820-21).
Id. at 774.
Id.
Id. at 775 (quoting Scarpaci, 292 N.W.2d at 831).
Id.
Olejnik, 147 F. Supp. 3d at 775
Id.
Id.
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in itself, unconstitutional; what is unconstitutional is the deprivation of such
an interest without due process of law.’”623 “[In determining] whether a
constitutional violation occurred, a court must ‘ask what process the state
provided, and whether it was constitutionally adequate.’”624 In situations
where no process is given to plaintiffs before an act occurs, “post-deprivation
remedies [may be] sufficient to safeguard individuals’ due process rights.”625
“When a deprivation is random and unauthorized, post-deprivation tort
remedies are often sufficient to address the resulting loss.”626 Here, the court
explained that even if England “acted outside of her statutory authority when
she ordered Olejnik’s autopsy, [her] actions would be random and
unauthorized,” in that they were “impossible to predict or preempt, not a
proper exercise of her state-delegated power, and not facilitated by
established state procedures.”627 The court held, “England’s taking of
material from the Olejnik autopsy is [exactly the] unpredictable[,] random[,]
and unauthorized conduct that a government can neither predict nor prevent
with pre-deprivation process.”628 However, given the circumstances, postdeprivation remedies works to give the parents a sufficient process.629 The
court found that Wisconsin law provides for post-deprivation remedies,
therefore the parents did receive the process to which they were due, even
though it occurred after the fact.630
Altogether, the court reasoned that, even though the medical examiner
took Olejnik’s remains because she was present at the autopsy, she was not
acting in her official capacity as an examiner when she undertook those
actions and, therefore, England was not acting under color of law when she
misappropriated Olejnik’s remains for her own private use in cadaver dog
training.631 Accordingly, the court determined that the county could not be
held liable under section 1983 for England’s alleged constitutional violations
stemming from the misappropriation.632 This case is a good example of the
reality mentioned herein that it is difficult for families to recover for the
mistreatment of human remains. More interesting, however, is that, within a
year of this case, the Louisiana Legislature passed a bill that effectively
sanctions such use of human remains.633
623.
624.
625.
626.
627.
628.
629.
630.
631.
632.
633.

Id. (quoting Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 125 (1990)) (emphasis in original).
Id. (quoting Zinermon, 494 U.S. at 126).
Olejnik, 147 F. Supp. 3d at 775.
Id. (citing Zinermon, 494 U.S. at 132).
Id. at 776.
Id.
Id.
Olejnik, 147 F. Supp. 3d at 776 (emphasis added).
Id. at 772.
See id. at 772.
See LA. STAT. ANN. § 9:1551 (2016).
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Pursuant to Acts 2016, No. 628, coroners in Louisiana can now remove
pieces of the deceased and provide these pieces to cadaver dog trainers
without notice or permission from families or descendants.634 While
superficially repugnant, under the Olejnik analysis of similar uses it is
unlikely that liability will lie against the coroners, either officially or
personally, for such actions. However, this new law does not (and
constitutionally cannot) avoid the potential problem raised when a family’s
religious beliefs prohibit such tampering with remains, as in the Rugova
matter.635 In this regard, it is strongly recommend that Louisiana coroners
under Act 2016, No. 628 use only donated remains to fulfill requests in order
to avoid running afoul of religious proscriptions on such human remains uses.
In the matter of Jensen v. U.S. National Park Service,636 Leyah Jensen,
the plaintiff, allegedly “found ‘exposed human remains’ in a sewer drain at a
National Historic Landmark on Nantucket Island, Massachusetts.”637 After
this discovery, she filed a police report and notified the United States National
Park Service (“NPS”) to make the NPS aware that the exposed remains were
what she believed to be a violation of Native American Graves Protection and
Repatriation Act (“NAGPRA”).638 Jensen never heard back from the NPS,
which she alleged caused her “‘two years of financial, mental, emotional, and
physical stresses of attempting to maintain lawful protocols while awaiting
response from the [NPS],” in addition to causing “‘irreparable damage to
American history.’”639 Jensen filed suit, pro se, for damages under these
arguments.640 The NPS argued that the court should “dismiss Jensen’s
[c]omplaint for lack of jurisdiction, [as well as] her failure to state a claim on
which relief may be granted,” further asserting that she lacked the standing
necessary to bring a claim under NAGPRA and that she did not allege the
required elements for a NAGPRA claim.641
The issue here is whether Jensen is a proper party to bring action under
the NAGPRA.642 First, “‘[f]ederal courts lack jurisdiction over claims against
the United States unless the government has waived its sovereign
immunity.’”643 “The Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) comprises a limited
waiver of federal sovereign immunity, which allows the government to be

634.
635.
636.
637.
638.
639.
640.
641.
642.
643.

§ 9:1551(F).
See Rugova, 132 A.D.3d at 225.
113 F. Supp. 3d 431 (D. Mass. 2015).
Id. at 433 (D. Mass. 2015).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Jensen, 113 F. Supp. 3d at 433.
Id.
Id. (quoting Sanchez v. United States, 740 F.3d 47, 50 (1st Cir. 2014)).
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held liable for certain tortious acts and omissions.”644 “However, prior to
permitting suit against the United States, a litigant is required to file an
administrative claim with the agency having jurisdiction.”645 Here, Jensen
failed to present evidence that she was in compliance with this procedural
prerequisite and, as such, the court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over her
claim.646
Nonetheless, to ensure completeness, the court also analyzed standing
under NAGPRA.647 To demonstrate standing for NAGPRA purposes, an
individual must “‘allege [ ] such a personal stake in the outcome of the
controversy’ as to warrant [the] invocation of federal-court jurisdiction and
to justify the exercise of the court’s remedial powers on [her] behalf.’”648
Furthermore, a person must show an injury is: (1) “‘concrete, particularized,
and actual or imminent;’” (2) “‘fairly traceable to the challenged action;’”
and (3) “‘redressable by a favorable ruling.’”649 NAGPRA also established
“rights of tribes and lineal descendants to obtain repatriation of human
remains and cultural items from federal agencies and museums, and protects
human remains and cultural items found on federal public and tribal lands.”650
Jensen was neither a tribal claimant nor a descendant claimant of human
remains, did not “discover the human remains on tribal or federal lands,” and
“fail[ed] to identify the remains as Native American.”651 First, in order to
assert a valid claim under NAGPRA, a person must be, “a tribal or descendant
claimant of the remains, [which is] a requisite for standing within the ‘zone
of interests’ protected by NAGPRA.”652 Second, “there are no tribal lands on
the Island of Nantucket,” so as to validate Jensen’s claim that she found the
remains on tribal land within the meaning of NAGPRA.653 Likewise, the
lands along the north shore of Nantucket are not considered federal, but rather
are municipal or state-owned.654 Lastly, a person who discovers remains must
identify the remains as Native American of a currently existing tribe, which
Jensen failed to do.655 Therefore, “Jensen lack[ed the] standing [necessary]

644.
645.
646.
647.
648.
649.
650.
2014)).
651.
652.
653.
654.
655.

Id. at 434 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1) (2018)).
Id. (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2675(a) (2018)).
Jensen, 113 F. Supp. 3d at 434.
Id. (quoting Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498-99 (1975)).
Id.
Id. (quoting Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 568 U.S. 398, 409 (2013)).
Id. (citing 25 U.S.C. § 3001 (2018); Thorpe v. Borough of Thorpe, 770 F.3d 255, 262 (3d Cir.
Jensen, 113 F. Supp. 3d at 434-35.
Id. at 434 (Bonnichsen v. United States, 357 F.3d 962, 970 (9th Cir. 2004)).
Id.
Id. at 434-35.
Id. at 435 (citing 43 C.F.R. § 10.2(d); Bonnichsen, 367 F.3d at 875–76).
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to invoke NAGPRA,” and subsequently, “the court . . . lack[ed] subjectmatter jurisdiction to [hear her] claim” on the matter.656
This case is useful in that it reviews the basics of standing under
NAGPRA. However, the case is also illustrative of NAGPRA’s narrow
scope, as it only applies to Native American remains and federal/tribal
property.657 Because Jensen met neither of these elements, she did not have
standing under NAGPRA.658 It is unclear from these facts whether a state
version of NAGPRA may have applied to this scenario. As it seems from the
facts, Jensen was merely upset by the erosion of remains from a drainage
slough and thought the NPS should deal with the matter.659 In such a case,
there is likely no cause of action for erosion under the Massachusetts version
of NAGPRA, as such laws do not generally apply to exposure of remains by
natural or semi-natural processes.660 Instead, it seems that, perhaps, a small
amount of coddling by NPS regarding the progress of the matter may have
avoided the expense of this suit.
The recent case of Thorpe v. Borough of Jim Thorpe,661 is another
example of the limited utility of NAGPRA. Multi-sport Olympic gold
medalist, Jim Thorpe, died in 1953 without a will.662 Thorpe’s “estate was
assigned to his third wife, Patricia (“Patsy”), who eventually buried him in
what is now Jim Thorpe, Pennsylvania (“the Borough”) . . . . over the
objections of several children from his previous marriages.663 The merger of
the boroughs Mauch Chunk and East Mauch Chunk created Jim Thorpe,
Pennsylvania and specifically named as a condition of Thorpe’s burial in the
town.664 Because “Thorpe was a Native American of Sauk heritage and a
member of the Sac and Fox Nation of Oklahoma,” Thorpe’s eight children
protested their father’s burial in Pennsylvania, “advocating that he be
reburied on Sac and Fox tribal land in Oklahoma.”665 In 2010, John Thorpe
(son of Thorpe and his second wife) sued the Borough for failure to comply
with the inventory and repatriation provisions in NAGPRA because the
Borough is the situs of Thorpe’s burial.666 The district court found, “that the
Borough was a ‘museum’ within the meaning of NAGPRA,” and as such,

656.
657.
658.
659.
660.
661.
662.
663.
664.
665.
666.

Jensen, 113 F. Supp. 3d at 435.
Id. (citing 25 U.S.C. § 3001).
Id. (quoting Bonnichsen, 357 F.3d at 970).
Id. at 433.
MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 9 § 26A (LexisNexis 2018).
770 F.3d 255 (3d Cir. 2014).
Id. at 257 (3d Cir. 2014).
Id.
Id. at 257, 258.
Id. at 257.
Thorpe, 770 F.3d at 257.
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“required the Borough to disinter Thorpe’s remains and [repatriate] them to
the Sac and Fox tribe as requested by John Thorpe.”667
On appeal, the issue was whether a town may be considered a “museum”
within the meaning of NAGPRA so as to warrant the exhumation and
relocation of human remains that had been buried there.668 “NAGPRA
requires museums and federal agencies possessing or controlling holdings or
collections of Native American human remains to inventory those remains,
notify the affected tribes, and, upon the request of a known lineal descendent
of the deceased Native American or of the tribe, return such remains.”669
Under NAGPRA, a “museum” is defined as “‘any institution or state or local
government agency (including any institution of higher learning) that
receives federal funds and has possession of, or control over, Native
American [remains].’”670 Here, “[t]he Borough is a local government entity
that maintains Jim Thorpe’s burial site . . . [and] has ‘possession of, or control
over’ [his] remains.”671 While “[t]he district court found that the Borough
was a museum because the record showed that the Borough received federal
funds after the enactment of NAGPRA,” the appellate court found that the
Borough is not actually a “museum” as NAGPRA intends, therefore it is “not
required to comply with NAGPRA’s procedural requirement of providing an
inventory of Thorpe’s remains,” nor was it “subject to the statute’s
requirement that his remains be ‘returned’ to Thorpe’s descendants for
‘repatriation’ at their request.”672
“‘The purpose of [NAGPRA] is to protect Native American burial sites
and the removal of human remains’ . . . . [and to] shield against further
injustices to Native Americans.”673 The Third Circuit noted, “[i]t was not
intended to be wielded as a sword to settle familial disputes within Native
American families,” and that it is an inappropriate extension of the law if the
court were to enforce NAGPRA’s repatriation provisions in this situation.674
“Section 3003 [of NAGPRA] applies to a ‘museum which has possession or
control over holdings or collections of Native American human remains’ . . .
[which] implies that the statute assumes that a museum is holding or
collecting the remains for the purposes of display or study, as opposed to
serving as an original burial site.”675 Furthermore, NAGPRA’s text “requires
667. Id.
668. Id. at 259.
669. Id. at 257 (citing 25 U.S.C. §§ 3003, 3005 (2018)).
670. Id. at 262 (quoting 25 U.S.C. § 3001(8) (2018)).
671. Thorpe, 770 F.3d at 262.
672. Id. at 262-63.
673. Id. at 260, 265 (quoting Kickapoo Traditional Tribe of Texas v. Chacon, 46 F. Supp. 2d 644,
649 (W.D. Tex. 1999)).
674. Id. at 265.
675. Thorpe, 770 F.3d at 266 (citing 25 U.S.C. § 3003 (2018)).
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that remains be ‘returned’ . . . [which] assumes that the human remains were
moved from their intended final resting place.”676 However, “Thorpe was
buried in the Borough by his wife, [who] had the legal authority to decide
where he would be buried.”677 As such, “there is nowhere for Thorpe to be
‘returned’ to,” because his wife intended to bury Thorpe in the Borough, and
that is where he remains.678 Altogether, the Third Circuit concluded Congress
did not intend a literal application of the NAGPRA text as interpreted by
Thorpe’s children, and as a result the Borough is not considered a “museum”
under NAGPRA, which if plainly read, would have required the repatriation
of Thorpe’s remains to his descendants.679 Writs on this matter were denied
by the United States Supreme Court.680 The result reached in this case is a
correct analysis of NAGPRA. Had the Third Circuit upheld the district
court’s decision, innumerable public cemeteries nationwide would be subject
to NAGPRA repatriation demands that would, undoubtedly, conflict with the
wishes of the deceased regarding their final resting place. Such a result would
be absurd and could turn lawful interment laws into unnecessary legal
battlegrounds.
The matter of White v. Univ. of California,681 presents an interesting twist
on the standard NAGPRA trope. Somewhat in the vein of the Bonnichsen v.
United States682 matter, a group of anthropologists brought suit against the
University of California to stop the planned repatriation of a collection of
roughly 9000-year-old Native American skeletal remains.683 Although they
had done some scientific assessment of the remains—enough to conclude that
the remains were those of Native Americans—the anthropologists argued that
this ancient sample needed additional study before repatriation.684 Further,
despite the analysis done, no conclusion could be drawn to link the remains
to any specific existing tribe.685 In the absence of any identifying
information, the University wanted to provide the remains to the current
nearest (geographic) tribe.686 Unlike the Bonnichsen case, a bellwether for
NAGPRA cases regarding ancient remains,687 this case never really got past
676. Id. at 265 (citing 25 U.S.C. § 3005 (2018)).
677. Id. at 266.
678. Id.
679. Id. (quoting § 3001(13); § 3003).
680. Sac & Fox Nation v. Borough of Jim Thorpe, 136 S. Ct. 84, 84 (2015).
681. 765 F.3d 1010 (9th Cir. 2014).
682. Bonnichsen v. United States, 367 F.3d 864, 868 (9th Cir. 2004).
683. White v. Univ. of California, 765 F.3d 1010, 1015-16 (9th Cir. 2014).
684. See id. at 1020.
685. See id. at 1018, 1020.
686. See id. at 1018.
687. See generally Ryan M. Seidemann, Time for a Change? The Kennewick Man Case and its
Implications for the Future of the Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act, 106 W. VA.
L. REV. 149, 150 (2003) (reviewing the Bonnichsen case and others similar).
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procedural hurdles.688 In this case, the plaintiffs claimed that the University
of California system violated NAGPRA by failing to make a valid finding
that the remains were Native American and should be repatriated, breached
public trust by refusing to allow the continued analysis of the remains, and
violated the anthropologists’ First Amendment rights by restricting them
from expressing themselves through their research on the remains.689 In fact,
the crux of the legal issues in this case turned on whether a NAGPRA suit
may proceed without affected tribes as parties.690 The court did not consider
any of the plaintiffs’ of the substantive allegations.691
Shortly after filing suit, the university system moved to dismiss the case,
stating that the tribes that it intended to return the remains to were necessary
parties and that, due to sovereign immunity, they could not be sued.692 The
court found that the tribes were necessary parties.693 The court further found
that the tribes, as sovereign nations, were immune from suit unless they
waived their immunity or Congress waived it for them.694 Because neither of
these things occurred and the tribes did not intervene in the case, the matter
could not proceed.695 Part of this finding determined that NAGPRA is not
such a congressional waiver of sovereign immunity.696 In the absence of
necessary parties, the case could not go on.697
With this ruling, the Ninth Circuit created a bizarrely circular scenario
whereby determinations of Native American ancestry and decisions to
repatriate human remains can never be challenged if tribes do not want them
to be challenged.698 In order to avoid scrutiny of NAGPRA decisions to
repatriate all the tribes need do is assert immunity and they will win every
time. It is similarly disappointing that the court did not address any of the
substantive issues raised by the scientists in this case, as most of them are res
nova issues. However, both the subject matter jurisdiction issue (i.e.,
immunity) and the substantive issues are too complex for this brief review
and should be the subject of a more intensive review and debate.

688. See White, 765 F.3d at 1029 (case was dismissed because the Repatriation Committee was
entitled to immunity and had not waived their immunity by filing another lawsuit in California).
689. Id. at 1021-22.
690. Id. at 1015.
691. See id. at 1022, 1029.
692. Id. at 1022.
693. White, 765 F.3d at 1029.
694. Id.
695. Id.
696. Id.
697. Id.
698. White, 765 F.3d at 1030 (Murguia, J., dissenting) (hinting at the notion of a party being able to
stifle the rights of others through its absence).
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DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS

The nature of a nationwide jurisprudential review of an ever-evolving
area of the law is it is difficult to make any overarching conclusions regarding
the matters herein discussed. As noted in a similar, prior article:
[t]he cases reviewed herein clearly indicate that cemeteries and
human remains, from a legal perspective, cannot be pigeonholed as
contracts or property cases (or both) in any traditional sense. Once
the grief component is added to any set of straightforward laws and
facts, the dynamics change. Cemetery and human remains law can
best be seen as a form of quasi-property law. Many of the terms used
and concepts referred to are property concepts. However, the unique
nature of the subject - i.e., the dead and the special treatment of the
dead in Western culture - means that the judicial and legislative
systems view the traditional property concepts through the lens of
grief and alter some of those traditional property law concepts to fit
this special niche of the law.699
Not much has changed in the way of conclusory statements since those were
printed in 2013. The law of the dead continues to defy classification under
any broad legal regime and, with the rise in the number of problems related
to the dead noted in the introduction, such cases will only continue to
proliferate. Reviews such as this are necessary to corral the disparate threads
of the law of the dead in order to allow practitioners to find their way in the
dark while navigating these complex and sensitive matters.

699. Seidemann, supra note 57, at 69-70.
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